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Lochner, Liquorand Longshoremen: A Puzzle
in Progressive Era Federalism
Barry Cushman*

I
INTRODUCTION
In 1890, the Supreme Court shocked and thrilled the civilized world with
the announcement that dry states could not prohibit the sale of liquor
shipped in from outside the state. So long as the out-of-state goods remained
in their "original packages," the Court held, they retained their character as
interstate commerce subject only to federal regulation.' The consequences
for the cause of local sobriety were, predictably, catastrophic. The proliferation in temperance territory of "original package saloons," at which one
could purchase liquor free from the superintendence of local liquor authorities, was appalling to dry eyes.2 Members of Congress immediately proposed a bill to authorize the states again to regulate such sales. It was enacted only over strenuous objections that such legislation unconstitutionally
delegated congressional authority to regulate interstate transactions and
thereby authorized unconstitutional disuniformity in the regulation of interstate commerce.3 While the Court would consistently approve this and other
similar congressional legislation, the debate over constitutional constraints
on such congressional authorizations would persist over the course of the
next half-century.4 It is only fairly recently that such measures became
"unexceptionable."'

*Elizabeth D. & Richard A. Merrill Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A., Amherst
College, 1982; M.A., Ph.D., J.D., University of Virginia. Many thanks to Patty Cushman, Joel Goldstein,

John Jeffries, Gerry Leonard, George Rutherglen, Larry Walker, Steve Walt, and Ted White for helpful
comments on earlier drafts, and to Ray Reduque for excellent research assistance. Earlier versions of this
paper were presented at the joint meeting of the Sections on Legal History and Maritime Law at the 2000
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, and in the Elizabeth Battelle Clark Legal
History Series at Boston University School of Law.
'Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).

'See R. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment (1995).
3

See infra, text at nn.100-1 1.
'See infra, text at nn. 112-46.
'New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992).
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A parallel debate unfolded in the more recondite domain of admiralty,
with strikingly different results. In 1917, in the controversial case of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,6 the Supreme Court held that New York's
workmen's compensation statute could not constitutionally apply to to a
workplace injury sustained over navigable waters. The Court relied upon its
dormant Commerce Clause decisions in the liquor context in holding that
such an application of the state statute would interfere with the uniformity
of maritime law contemplated by Article III's grant of admiralty jurisdiction
to the federal courts. Yet when Congress enacted legislation authorizing the
application of state workmen's compensation statutes to maritime workplace
injuries, the Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it delegated congressional authority to regulate maritime matters and thereby authorized
unconstitutional disuniformity in the substantive law of admiralty.7 The contention that had failed in the Commerce Clause context prevailed in admiralty.
This curious asymmetry in the Court's federalism jurisprudence has never
been satisfactorily explored. Admiralty scholars, content for the most part to
explain Jensen and its progeny as manifestations of judicial hostility to
worker-friendly Progressive legislation, have paid scant attention to cognate
developments in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Similarly, historians of
constitutional federalism, perhaps viewing admiralty jurisprudence as an
occult science, have largely neglected the field. Yet an excursion into interdoctrinal comparative law promises to shed new light on both subjects. This
article challenges the traditional interpretation of the Jensen line of cases,
while at the same time integrating these developments in admiralty law into
the larger story of cooperative federalism and legal and social reform in the
Progressive Era. In addition to offering a reinterpretation of these leading
admiralty decisions, the article aims to identify the salient features of the
political and constitutional landscape within which distinctive forms of
cooperative federalism emerged in the Progressive Era, and to illuminate the
manner in which those features helped to shape the asymmetric constitutional law of federal-state cooperation.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II first outlines the established historiographical treatment of the Jensen line of cases, and then shows why that
conventional view cannot withstand scrutiny. This critique is designed to
create sufficient intellectual space for an alternative interpretation, to the

6244 U.S. 205 (1917).

'See infra, text at nn. 46-94.
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construction of which the balance of the article is devoted. Parts III and IV
set out what I take to be the central puzzles posed by Jensen and its progeny. Part III sketches the first puzzle: why did the Court hold that the
Admiralty Clause of Article III imposed greater disabilities on state regulatory authority than did the dormant Commerce Clause? Part IV lays out the
second puzzle: why did the Court hold that Congress was restrained by uniformity and nondelegation norms in attempting to remove disabilities
imposed by the Admiralty Clause, but not when removing those created by
the dormant Commerce Clause? The remainder of the article explores possible solutions to these puzzles. Part V reviews contemporary explanations
of Jensen and finds them ultimately unsatisfactory. Parts VI and VII offer my
own solution. In Part VI, I argue that in order to understand the impulses animating these admiralty decisions one must first situate them in the broader
context of the movement for uniform laws in which leaders of the bar, and
at least some of the Justices, were heavily invested. In the concluding Part
VII, I venture some speculations on how the anomalies might better be
accounted for by linking the uniformity impulse to the distinctive context of
temperance reform, tort reform, and cooperative federalism in which the
cases were decided.
II
JENSEN AND THE LOCHNER ANALOGY
In his recent concurrence in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, Justice
Stevens opined that "Jensen is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty
case today as Lochner v. New York ... would be in a case under the Due

Process Clause."8 This analogy to Lochner is open to at least two interpretations, and both are represented in the Jensen historiography. The first, rooted in the separation of powers concerns undergirding our preoccupation with
the countermajoritarian difficulty, suggests that the decision constituted an
unwarranted judicial usurpation of state legislative authority.9 The second is
grounded in the potent mixture of Legal Realism and Progressive historiography that has served as the dominant paradigm in constitutional history for
much of this century.' This interpretation insinuates that in both Lochner
and Jensen the Court was pouring its own substantive values into the constitutional text, and that those values were those of conservative, laissez8510 U.S. 443, 458 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
'See, e.g., id. at 459 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"0See, e.g., F Rodell, Nine Men (1955); B.wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law
(1942); R. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (1960); A. Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft
to Warren (1958).
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faire, Social Darwinist, anti-labor reactionaries bent on enacting Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics. The case for this interpretation of Jensen is
advanced in no small measure by the fact that its author was James Clark
McReynolds, an apostle of Lochnerism and quite possibly the least attractive person ever to sit on the Supreme Court of the United States."
This second interpretation of Jensen can be found in admiralty treatises
and journal articles written from Jensen's immediate aftermath to the present day. Listen to Merrick Dodd, writing in the pages of the Columbia Law
Review in 1921: "As a matter of fact, the division of the court, with Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke, together with one other Justice deciding in
favor of the employee and the remainder of the court under the leadership of
the conservative Mr. Justice McReynolds upholding the contentions of the
employer, is so familiar as to suggest that, whether consciously or not, it was
not primarily the question of uniformity which determined the court's decision .... A comparison of [Jensen] with recent decisions such as Hammer
v. Dagenhartinvalidating the federal child labor law, Evans v. Gore impliedly denying the power of Congress under the Sixteenth Amendment to tax
state bonds, and Gilbert v. Minnesota, upholding state interference with freedom of speech in matters of national concern, may give ground for certain
ironical reflections as to the purposes for which the doctrine of federal
supremacy is invoked."' 2 In his 1970 treatise, David Robertson reported that
Jensen had "been explained in any number of ways, among the least reassuring of which has been the intimation that a lack of sympathy for maritime
plaintiffs was involved."' 3 And just recently, another distinguished admiralty
scholar has written: "It is necessary to apply a broader context than admiralty jurisdiction to understand the majority opinion, written by Justice
McReynolds, one of the most conservative justices to sit on the Supreme
Court, who would later be thought of as one of the four horsemen (of the
apocalypse) because of his total opposition to any governmental regulation
of business activity. Thus, McReynolds would adopt any rationale to extirpate confiscatory legislation that deprived the employer of its three common
law defenses to employee injuries: contributory negligence, assumption of
the risk, and fellow servant negligence."' 4
Both the analogy to Lochner and the persistence of the Progressive interpretation of Jensen are something of a curiosity. For starters, admiralty was
one area in which the doctrine of "liberty of contract" never acquired a

"See J. Bond, I Dissent: The Legacy of Chief [sic] Justice James Clark McReynolds (1992).
' 2Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law, 21 Colum. L. Rev.
647, 660, 665 (1921).
I'D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 193 (1970).
"Sweeney, The Admiralty Law of Arthur Browne, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 59, 120-21 (1995).
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foothold.' 5 Yet there is a deeper level at which both the analogy and the interpretive perspective upon which it rests have become problematic. Over the

past generation, a wave of revisionist scholarship on the history of substantive due process has displaced the Progressive interpretation as the dominant
understanding. On further investigation, it appeared that there were simply
too many decisions that could not be reconciled with the conventional story
line.'6 Liberty of contract and substantive due process are now seen by most
scholars of the period as the constitutional manifestations of an array of
antebellum ideological commitments: northern free labor ideology, the
Madisonian aspiration to a faction-free politics, and the Jacksonian revulsion against special legislation.'7 Yet one detects no similar erosion of the
Progressive interpretation of Jensen. Indeed, much of contemporary admiralty scholarship proceeds as if no such transformation in our understanding
of substantive due process had occurred. Yet this interpretation of Jensen can

5

"See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (upholding statute requiring seamen to carry out the
contracts contained in their shipping articles); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169 (1903) (upholding
statute prohibiting advance payment of seamen's wages); Thompson v. Lucas, 252 U.S. 358 (1920) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding provisions of Seamen's Act providing for payment of
one-half wages on demand by seaman at port); Stratheam S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding provisions of Seamen's Act providing for payment of
one-half wages on demand by seaman at port).
"See, e.g., Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the
Progressive Era, 1983 Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc. Y.B. 53, 70 ("[Hlostility to protective legislation was just not
the norm in the Progressive era'); Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective?, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1049 (1997); Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95, 10005 (1999); Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va. L. Rev. 559, 561-71, 586-638 nn.
22-121 (1997) (cataloging the many working hours regulations, wage and payment regulations, occupational licensing statutes, state child labor laws, utility regulations, and federal, state and local taxation and
police power statutes upheld by the Court during the "Lochner era"). For contemporary recognition of
these deficiencies in the progressive interpretation, see, e.g., Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage
Legislation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 555 (1924) ("the catalogue shows that the Court has sustained many
more regulatory statutes than it has annulled"); Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 294, 294-95 (of the 560 cases rising under the Fourteenth Amendment
between 1887 and 1911, only three invalidated social and economic regulation); Brown, Due Process of
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 943, 944-45 (1927) (Court invalidated six
of 98 police regulations challenged on due process grounds between 1868 and 1912, seven of 97 between
1913 and 1920, and fifteen of 53 between 1921 and 1927).
"See, e.g., McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters of 'Laissez-faire' Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970 (1975); H.Gillman, The
Constitution Besieged (1993); M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis
of Legal Orthodoxy (1992), 19-31; Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 293, 298, 304-31 (1985); 0. Fiss,
Troubled Beginnings of the Modem State, 1888-1910 (1993), 156, 160; Siegel, Understanding the
Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev.
187, 189-92 (1984); Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921,5 Law & Hist. Rev. 249, 278 (1987); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 873
Colum. L. Rev. 873, 878-89 (1987).
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no more withstand scrutiny than has the Progressive interpretation of
Lochner itself.
If the claim is made at the institutional level-that the Court itself (or at
least a majority of the Justices) was motivated by animus or callousness
toward workers-several cases handed down the same term as Jensen immediately pose explanatory difficulties. In Bunting v. Oregon,'" by a vote of 53 with Justice Brandeis not participating, the Court upheld a maximum hour
law for workers in mills, factories and manufacturing establishments. In
Wilson v. New, 9 a closely divided Court upheld a national maximum hour
and minimum wage law for railway workers. In Stettler v. O'Hara,° an
equally divided Court with Justice Brandeis not participating affirmed a
lower court decision upholding Oregon's minimum wage law for women.
And in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,2' the Court upheld that state's
workmen's compensation statute.
"Fair enough," the Progressive historian might reply. "My claim can't be
sustained at the institutional level. But note that McReynolds and Van
Devanter, the two Four Horsemen who sat on the Jensen Court, dissented in
each of the pro-worker cases you just mentioned. None of those cases
impeaches my claim with respect to them."
That's true. But there is no shortage of cases in which McReynolds and
Van Devanter voted in ways that do impeach the Progressive interpretation.
Van Devanter wrote the opinions upholding the Federal Employers' Liability
Act 22 and the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 23 and he, McReynolds,

18243 U.S. 426
243 U.S. 332
2243 U.S. 629
2'243 U.S. 219
22

(1917).
(1917).
(1917).
(1917).

Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Commonly known as the Federal
Employers's Liablity Act, the Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65 is codified (as amended) at 45 U.S.C. §§
51-60.
"Southem Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). The railway challenged the Safety Appliance
Acts, i.e., the Act of Mar. 2, 1893, 29 Stat. 85, as amended by the Act of Mar. 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943. As
subsequently amended, those Acts are codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-12. See also United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936) (all Four Horsemen join opinion holding that state-owned railroads were subject to
the Act); New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 265 U.S. 41 (1924) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Sutherland join Butler's opinion reading expansively the duty imposed by the Act on railroads to have
their cars equipped with power brakes for the safety of their employees); United States v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 254 U.S. 251 (1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion rejecting the claim that the Act
does not apply to "transfer trains" operating within rail yard and not on main track); Spokane & I. Emp.
R.R. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344 (1916) (Van Devanter joins opinion holding that street railway cars
employed in interstate traffic were subject to the Act) (McReynolds takes no part).
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Sutherland and Butler voted in favor of workers in dozens of cases brought
under those two acts 24 -often straining to find that the injured plaintiff was
2

See, e.g., Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 303 U.S. 10 (1938) (McReynolds and Butler join opinion
upholding award under FSAA); Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 294 U.S. 529 (1935) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion reversing directed verdict for defendant under FSAA); Moore v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934) (upholding federal court's jurisdiction of employee's injury claims under the
FSAA in connection with FELA by reversing a lower court determination adverse to employee, with all
Four Horsemen joining opinion); Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 288 U.S. 275 (1933) (Van Devanter and
Sutherland join opinion upholding award under FELA) (McReynolds and Butler dissent); Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join Butler's opinion affirming award under FELA for injuries sustained by stevedore assaulted by his foreman); Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry. v. Ward, 252 U.S. 18 (1920) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Holloway, 246 U.S. 525 (1918) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Union Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918)
(Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee under FELA); Great N.
Ry. v. Donaldson, 246 U.S. 121 (1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); Union Pac. R.R. v. Huxoll, 245 U.S. 535 (1918) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Washington Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Scala, 244 U.S. 630 (1917)
(Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); New York Cent. & H.R. R.R.
v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360 (1917) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion affirming award under
FELA); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion affirming award under FELA); St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311 (1917) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Williams, 242 U.S. 462 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under
FSAA); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 295 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169 (1916) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Atlantic City R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Spokane & 1. Emp.
R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA and FSAA); San Antonio & Ark. Pass Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476 (1916) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bower,
241 U.S. 470 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Proffitt, 241 U.S. 462 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
affirming award under FELA); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290 (1916) (McReynolds joins
Van Devanter's opinion affirming award under FELA); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Stewart, 241 U.S. 261
(1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under
FELA); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Brown, 241 U.S. 223 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FSAA); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award
under FELA); Great N. Ry. v. Knapp, 240 U.S. 464 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
affirming award under FELA); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Skaggs, 240 U.S. 66 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA notwithstanding error in contributory negligence
instruction); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Wright, 239 U.S. 548 (1916) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's
opinion affirming award under FELA); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Wagner, 239 U.S. 452 (1915) (Van Devanter
and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and invalidating company's attempt to contract out of liability under the Act); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352 (1915) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Great N. Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S.
349 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA);
Norfolk S.R.R. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269 (1915) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming
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engaged in interstate commerce.25 In 1917 both McReynolds and Van
Devanter joined opinions upholding the New York26 and Iowa workers' com-

award under FELA); New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Carr, 238 U.S. 260 (1915) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Wright, 235 U.S.
376 (1914) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming award under FELA); Southern Ry. v.
Crockett, 234 U.S. 725 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FELA and FSAA);
Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming award under
FELA); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming
award under FELA and FSAA); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913) (Van Devanter writes
opinion affirming award under FELA); Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912) (Van
Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FELA and invalidating company's attempt to contract out
of liability under the Act); Chicago Junction Ry. v. King, 222 U.S. 222 (1911) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming award under FSAA); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding award under FSAA).
'See, e.g., Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540 (1924) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Butler join Sutherland's opinion holding that bystander enlisted by conductor to unload heavy freight at
station was employed in interstate commerce); Erie R.R. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86 (1920) (McReynolds joins
opinion holding that an employee whose duty it was to dry sand in stoves in a small structure near the
tracks and to supply it to locomotives used in both inter-and intrastate commerce, injured while returning from getting a drink of water when returning from an ash-pit whither he had gone to dump ashes
taken by him from one of the stoves after sanding locomotives bound for other states, was employed in
interstate commerce) (Van Devanter dissents); Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920) (McReynolds
joins opinion holding that employee injured while running a gasoline engine to pump water into a tank
for use by locomotives was employed in interstate commerce) (Van Devanter dissents); Kinzell v.
Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry., 250 U.S. 130 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion holding that
employee injured while removing dirt and stones from track was employed in interstate commerce);
Southern Ry. v. Puckett, 244 U.S. 571 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion holding that
employee who tripped in a train yard while on his way to assist in the rescue of a fellow employee trapped
under a wrecked car was employed in interstate commerce); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Winters, 242
U.S. 353 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding judgment for injured employee
notwithstanding fact that employee was not engaged in interstate commerce at time of injury, because defendant did not object to the application of FELA at trial); Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 229 U.S.
146 (1913) (Van Devanter writes opinion holding that an employee injured while carrying bolts to be
used to repair a railroad bridge used by interstate trains was employed in interstate commerce);
Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Smith, 250 U.S. 101 (1919) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion upholding FELA award for cook injured while preparing food for a crew of
railroad bridge carpenters).
2
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion
upholding New York's statute). See also Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 281 U.S.
98 (1930) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of New York's statute); R.E. Sheehan
Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371 (1924) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of New York's
statute); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922) (Van Devanter joins opinion upholding provisions
of New York's statute) (McReynolds dissents); New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919) (Van
Devanter joins opinion upholding provision of New York's statute) (McReynolds dissents).

January 2001

Lochner, Liquor & Longshoremen

pensation statutes; 27 they and their fellow horsemen would subsequently vote
to uphold other states' statutes 28 and side with injured workers in contested
workers' compensation cases. 9 McReynolds and company rendered many
pro-plaintiff decisions in tort litigation involving injured employees," and
routinely upheld statutes abrogating the unholy trinity of common law
defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant

"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion upholding
Iowa's statute).
2
See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (all Four
Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of California's statute); Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 208 (1926) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions of Wisconsin's
statute); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) (Van Devanter joins Sutherland's opinion upholding provisions of Utah's statute) (Butler and McReynolds dissent); Madera Sugar Pine Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499 (1923) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding provisions
of California's statute); Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd., 255 U.S. 144 (1921) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion upholding provisions of Indiana's statute).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion upholding award); Boston & Me. R.R. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion upholding award); Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928) (Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion upholding award); see also United States v. Anner,
287 U.S. 470 (1933) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding award
under World War Veterans' Act).
3
See, e.g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) (McReynolds concurs in
result of opinion reversing dismissal of employee's action); Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S.
76 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion reversing judgment for employer on grounds that
jury instruction was erroneous); Erie R.R. v. Purucker, 244 U.S. 320 (1917) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244
U.S. 68 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee);
Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Erie R.R. v. Welsh, 242 U.S. 303 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Parker, 242 U.S.
13 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Brown v.
Pacific Coast Coal Co., 241 U.S. 571 (1916) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177 (1916) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Osborne v. Gray, 241 U.S. 16 (1916) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee); Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.,
233 U.S. 184 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for employee); Gila Valley, G. &
N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for employee); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Harvey, 228 U.S. 319 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for employee); George A. Fuller Co. v. McCloskey, 228 U.S. 194 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming
judgment for employee). One finds similar evidence in tort cases outside the employment context. See,
e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (MeReynolds joins opinion overturning contempt conviction of plaintiff for refusing to submit to a physical examination); Fairport, P. & E.R.R. v. Meredith,
292 U.S. 589 (1934) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding her contributory negligence); Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98
(1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing a judgment directing a verdict for the defendant); Best
v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934) (all Four Horsemen join opinion reversing judgment directing a verdict for the defendant); Miller v. Union Pac. R.R., 290 U.S. 227 (1933) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's opinion reversing judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition); Atlantic
Coast L.R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler join Sutherland's
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rule.3 And it bears emphasis that many of these decisions vindicated the
rights of maritime plaintiffs.32
Nor can the Progressive interpretation adequately account for the postJensen decisions invalidating congressional attempts to amend the "saving
opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and upholding statute creating rebuttable presumption of railroad's negligence); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 287 U.S. 86 (1932) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Sutherland join Butler's opinion dismissing defendant's appeal notwithstanding trial court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on the issue of contributory negligence, and upholding statute creating
rebuttable presumption of railroad's negligence); Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112
(1927) (all Four Horsemen join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and upholding statute allowing
punitive damage awards in respondent superior wrongful death cases); Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255
U.S. 317 (1921) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and ruling
that railroad carriers cannot limit their common law liability by contracting for exemption from the consequences of their own negligence); Panama R.R. v. Toppin, 252 U.S. 308 (1920) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); New York Cent. R.R. v. Mohney, 252 U.S.
152 (1920) (McReynolds joins, Van Devanter concurs in opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff);
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Chatman, 244 U.S. 276 (1917) (Van Devanter and
McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff and voiding stipulation in drover's pass
exempting carrier from liability for personal injuries caused by its own negligence); Chicago & A.R.R.
v. McWhin, 243 U.S. 422 (1917) (McReynolds joins Van Devanter's opinion affirming judgment for
plaintiff); McAllister v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 243 U.S. 302 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join
opinion reversing dismissal of plaintiff's action); Memphis St. Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 299 (1917) (Van
Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150
(1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Stewart, 228
U.S. 357 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Schuyler, 227 U.S. 601 (1913) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff); Doullut &
Williams Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 33 (1925) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join
McReynolds' opinion reversing judgment dismissing libels for want of admiralty jurisdiction).
3
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Sutherland join Butler's opinion affirming judgment for employee and holding constitutional an
Arkansas statute abrogating the fellow servant rule in cases involving corporate defendants); Bowersock
v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29 (1917) (Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for
employee and upholding provisions of a Kansas statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915)
(Van Devanter and McReynolds join opinion affirming judgment for employee and upholding Ohio
statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk); Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913) (Van Devanterjoins opinion affirming judgment for employee and upholding Indiana statute abrogating fellow servant rule in railroad cases);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541 (1912) (Van Devanter joins opinion affirming judgment for
employee and upholding Nebraska statute abrogating the fellow servant rule and the doctrine of contributory negligence in railroad cases).
2
See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41, 1936 AMC 1677 (1936) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding award despite claim that it intruded upon the
maritime jurisdiction); Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933) (all Four Horsemen join opinion upholding award under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Millers' Indem.
Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds opinion affirming state workmen's compensation award); State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S.
263 (1922) (Van Devanter joins McReynolds' opinion reversing judgment vacating award); Baltimore &
Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 1932 AMC 168 (1932) (Van Devanter, Sutherland,
and McReynolds join Butler's opinion upholding award under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
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to suitors" clause33 so as to permit the application of state workers' compensation statutes to maritime injuries.34 By the time the Court decided
Washington v. WC. Dawson & Co.3" in 1924, the other two horsemen of the
apocalypse-Pierce Butler and George Sutherland-had joined the Court
and McReynolds' majority. Any attempt to explain their votes as efforts to
scuttle workers' compensation for maritime employees encounters similar
confounding evidence. For we know that Butler had been a leader in the
campaign for workers' compensation in his home state of Minnesota;36 and
we also know that, while serving as a United States Senator from Utah,
Sutherland had been a principal proponent of a system of workers' compen-

Compensation Act); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 1934 AMC 1415 (1934) (all Four Horsemen join
opinion reversing dismissal of employee's action under Merchant Marine Act of 1920); Vancouver S.S.
Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445, 1933 AMC 487 (1933) (Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland join
Butler's opinion affirming judgment giving decedent stevedore's administratrix a cause of action enforceable in admiralty in rem against the vessel on which the injuries were sustained); Cortes v. Baltimore
Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 1933 AMC 9 (1932) (all Four Horsemen join opinion holding that failure to furnish adequate care to a seaman stricken with pneumonia was a personal injury giving the seaman's administrator a cause of action against the employer under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920); Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234, 1931 AMC 239 (1931) (all Four Horsemen join opinion interpreting
broadly the term "seaman" in the Merchant Marine Act so as to create a cause of action for a stevedore
injured while unloading a ship flying the German flag); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266
U.S. 171, 1924 AMC 1539 (1924) (Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion
interpreting jurisdiction of admiralty court widely enough to allow it to hear an employee's personal
injury claim), Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 1923 AMC 441 (1923)
(Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler join McReynolds' opinion upholding federal district court's jurisdiction to entertain wrongful death action); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 1939 AMC
1 (1939) (Butler joins opinion affirming judgment for injured seaman and holding that assumption of risk
was not a defense under the Jones Act) (McReynolds dissents, contending that the trial court erroneously refused defendant's request for a jury instruction on the availability of an assumption of risk defense);
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (all Four Horsemen join opinion affirming judgment for injured
seaman and holding that neither assumption of risk nor contributory negligence were defenses in actions
under the Jones Act or the maritime law); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 1936 AMC. 627 (1936)
(all Four Horsemen join opinion affirming a judgment for an injured seaman and holding that assumption of risk was not a defense under the Jones Act); International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S.
50, 1926 U.S. 1638 (1926) (all Four Horsemen join opinion join opinion holding that a stevedore engaged
in maritime work was a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act, and the fellow servant rule therefore did not apply); The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 1935 AMC 874 (1935) (holding that an allegation of negligence against a ship was in admiralty and as a result the suit could go forward, with all Four
Horsemen joining opinion).
33
Originally enacted as part of section nine of the first judiciary act. Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 76, the saving to suitors clause was reeanacted as part of the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091. The current version
is codified at 33 USC § 1333(1).
340 Stat. 385 (1917); 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
5264 U.S. 219 (1924).
36
D. Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed 18 (1964); F. Brown, The Social and Economic
Philosophy of Pierce Butler 96-97 (1945). The same was true of former President, then Chief Justice,
William Howard Taft. See J. Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (1968) at
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sation for the employees of interstate carriers," an ardent supporter of the

Seaman's Act of 1915,38 and a friend and political ally of Andrew Furuseth,
the president of the Seaman's Union.3 9 Moreover, McReynolds' opinion in
Dawson made explicit what he had suggested in his earlier opinion in
Knickerbocker Ice v. Stewart:4 "Without doubt," he wrote, "Congress has
power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for
compensating injuries."4 ' Congress accepted the counsel of this advisory
opinion when it enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act in 1927;" when the Act's constitutionality was challenged in Crowell v. Benson43 in 1932, all four horsemen joined the opinion
upholding it. As it would in other contexts during the tenures of Taft and
Hughes, the Court here was seeking not to obstruct legislative reform, but
instead to channel it into prescribed forms."
Jensen is, then, the Lochner of admiralty after all. Like Lochner, Jensen
has for decades been understood through the lens of a Progressive interpretation that cannot withstand scrutiny. This is not to say, of course, that
Jensen was "correctly decided." Nor does the mere discrediting of the
Progressive interpretation offer an adequate explanation of a decision that so
many at the time and since have thought was not merely unfortunate but
clearly wrong. Indeed, as I suggest in Part III, another analogy, that between
Jensen and the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
"J. Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State 63, 65-71(1951).
338 Stat. 1164 (1915) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22, 33, & 46 U.S.C.).
39

Paschal, supra note 37, at 71-72, 97, 125.
-253 U.S. 149 (1920).
264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924). That same term of Court, Van Devanter wrote the unanimous opinion
upholding the Jones Act, Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 1924 AMC 551 (1924).
'244 Stat. 1424 (1927).
43285 U.S. 22, 1933 AMC 200 (1932).
'"See Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 79.
41For contemporary criticism of Jensen, see Editorial, 3 Va. L. Reg. 290 (1917); Note, 17 Col. L. Rev.
703 (1917); Comment, 6 Cal. L. Rev. 69 (1917); Comment, 15 Mich. L. Rev. 657 (1917); Comment, 27
Yale L. J. 255 (1917); Comment, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 488 (1918); Note, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 743, 746 (1922);
Comment, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 145 (1917); Comment, 28 Yale L. J. 281 (1918); Note, 85 Cent. L. J. 57
(1917); Note, 6 111. L. Q. 157, 159 (1924); Dodd, supra note 12; E. Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty
Jurisdiction 20 (Johns Hopkins, 1922) ("This opinion in the Jensen case constituted in the minds of many
lawyers a most striking departure from the general principles of admiralty and maritime jurisprudence

heretofore developed under the American system"); Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the
Maritime Law, 38 Yale L. J. 476 (1929)("to those steeped in the tradition, the Jensen decision brought a
decided shock"); Conlen, Ten Years of the Jensen Case, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 926, 933 (1928) (the decision
of the Court was severely criticized"); Wylie, Admiralty Versus Compensation, 52 Am. L. Rev. 63, 66
(1917) ("it is hardly conceivable that the Supreme Court of the United States would render a decision so
far-reaching and so contrary to well-established principles").
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brings to light some anomalies that present Jensen's defenders with some
explanatory difficulties. And as Part IV's examination of contemporary
developments in Commerce Clause doctrine growing out of liquor regulation controversies reveals, those anomalies were only exacerbated by subsequent decisions invalidating congressional attempts to permit application of
state workmen's compensation statutes to maritime workplace accidents.
. III
JENSEN AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALOGY
One of the most striking facts about Jensen is that it was not initially conceptualized as a case about admiralty jurisdiction. The case was tried and
appealed through the New York state court system. Mr. Jensen's widow did
contend that the state statute was "not in conflict with the jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts, for Congress has not yet made the jurisdiction of admiralty over torts on navigable waters exclusive of all actions by the states."46 But
Southern Pacific does not appear to have asserted the contrary,47 and the
Court of Appeals of New York did not take up the question at all. Indeed,
neither the parties nor the court seem to have anticipated the ground upon
which the Supreme Court of the United States would ultimately dispose of
the case. That Court had not yet placed its imprimatur upon state workmen's
compensation laws, and thus Southern Pacific's principal contention before
the Court of Appeals of New York was that the statute deprived the employer of property without due process of law. This contention, which raised
what the New York court saw as "perhaps the most important question in the
case," accordingly attracted the greatest portion of the court's attention.48
Before quickly disposing of Southern Pacific's claim that the case was controlled by the Federal Employers Liability Act49 and then moving to the due
process question, however, the court turned its attention to the other principal issue in the case: whether the application of the state statute to employers and employees engaged wholly in interstate commerce would impose an
unconstitutional burden on such commerce. That is, to the extent that the
case was initially conceived as presenting a question concerning the boundary between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction, it was viewed as raising the issue not under the Admiralty Clause of Article III, but instead under
the dormant Commerce Clause.

'109 N.E. 600 (N.Y. 1915).

7

LId.

1d. at 602-04.
9
4 Id. at 602.
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The precedents did not hold out much hope that Southern Pacific's position would be sustained. Cooley v. Port of Wardens, which had established in
1851 that state and local governments might regulate "local" aspects of
interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action, had upheld
Philadelphia's regulation of pilotage in its port." More recently, and more to
the point, Sherlock v. Alling' had followed Cooley in upholding application
of an Indiana wrongful death statute to an accident occurring where admiralty law and jurisdiction otherwise reached. The plaintiff in error had contended that, as liability for injury resulting in death had existed neither at
common law nor under the maritime law, the statute enlarged the liabilities
of tortfeasors in such cases and thereby burdened interstate commerce.
Justice Field had written: "General legislation of this kind, prescribing the
liabilities or duties of citizens of a State, without distinction as to pursuit or
calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may affect persons
engaged in foreign or inter-state commerce

. .

. [W]ith reference to a great

variety of matters touching the rights and liabilities of persons engaged in
commerce, either as owners or navigators of vessels, the laws of Congress
are silent, and the laws of the State govern ....

[I]t may be said, generally,

that the legislation of a state, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties and liabilities of citizens, and only
indirectly and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or
water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or inter-state ....

Until Congress,

therefore, makes some regulation touching the liability of parties for marine
torts resulting in the death of the persons injured, we are of opinion that the
statute of Indiana applies."52
Following the wrongful death precedents, state and lower federal courts
had "held almost uniformly that the [workmen's compensation] acts would
be applicable" to maritime workplace injuries. 3 The New York Court of
Appeals was no exception, relying on Sherlock and related dormant
Commerce Clause decisions in holding that "the statute does not purport
directly to regulate or impose a burden upon commerce, but merely under-

3053

U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See also Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1865); Ex

parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572 (1880); Olsen v. Smith,
195 U.S. 332 (1904); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912).
5'93 U.S. 99 (1876).
"Id. at 103-04. See also The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (upholding application of Delaware's
wrongful death statute to a claim of death due to negligence on the high seas); Steamboat Co. v. Chase,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1873) (upholding application of Rhode Island statute giving a right of action to
a suit for death in the admiralty jurisdiction notwithstanding the contention that the claim was maritime
in nature).
"Note, 6 I11.L. Q. 157, 158-59 (1924).
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takes to regulate the relations between employers and employees in this
state. Such regulation may, and no doubt does, indirectly affect commerce,
but to the extent that it may affect interstate or foreign commerce it is plainly within the jurisdiction of the state, until congress by entering the field
excludes state action."5
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Jensen, Southern Pacific devoted thirty of its brief's
eighty pages to the claim that the statute violated due process,55 allotting
eleven pages to the dormant Commerce Clause argument. 6 Southern Pacific
did briefly contend that the application of the state statute "infringes upon
the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States," 7 but the argument
was purely statutory. "Such jurisdiction is by the provisions of the Judicial
Code made exclusive except in so far as there may be saved to suitors 'the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it."'5 5 The remedy provided by the state statute was not one the common law
was competent to give, the brief contended, and accordingly was not saved
to suitors under the saving clause. The brief did not so much as suggest that
application of the statute was precluded by force of Article III alone, nor that
Congress might not amend the saving clause so as to allow the state statute
to apply to maritime workplace injuries. The lone references that Southern
Pacific made to the requirement that the law of admiralty be uniform
appeared in quotations from two cases59 cited in support of an equal protection argument, not an Article III claim.' In short, the prevailing party in
Jensen had not yet divined the rationale upon which its victory would be
predicated. As one observer put it, "The point upon which the case was ultimately decided was hardly touched in the briefs on either side, and... until

"109 N.E. at 601.
5

5See Brief of Plaintiff-in-Error on Reargument, pp. 16-46.

56

See id. at 46-57. Jensen's answer to this contention consisted almost entirely of an extensive quotation from Sherlock v. Ailing. See Brief of the New York State Industrial Commission at 52-57.
5
'Id. at 66-69.
8
1d. at 67 (emphasis added).
"See id. at 59-60, quoting from The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875), and Workman
v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 558 (1900).

'The claim here was that the statute treated maritime employers differently from employers on land.
The statute substituted the workmen's compensation remedy for the common law remedy against
employers on land, but could not do so for maritime employers, as substitution of the statutory for the
admiralty remedy would destroy the uniformity of the maritime law. Accordingly, maritime employers

remained amenable to a suit in admiralty for injuries caused by negligence, whereas an employer on land
was insulated from such a suit at common law by the statute. Id. at 57-66. Jensen's widow responded
first, that as Southern Pacific claimed that it had not been negligent, neither the common law nor admiralty would have afforded her any remedy, and accordingly the state statute provided her with her sole

remedy in this case; and second, that even assuming there were a remedy available in admiralty, the
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the Jensen case the reported decisions of the court show not a trace of any
such question raised."'"
In light of the Court's unanimous decision earlier in the term upholding
the New York statute against the contention that it violated the Due Process
Clause,62 McReynolds declared that "only two of the grounds relied on for
reversal now demand special consideration." The first was the claim that the
case was controlled by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The second "of
the grounds relied on for reversal" was in fact suggested nowhere in the
briefs: "As here applied, the Workmen's Compensation Act conflicts with
the general maritime law, which constitutes an integral part of the federal
law under Art. III, section 2, of the Constitution, and to that extent is
invalid."63

It was the second of these grounds upon which the majority opinion
would rest. By virtue of the provision of Article III extending the judicial
power to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, McReynolds explained,
"Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law
which shall prevail throughout the country," and "in the absence of some
controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts
constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Moreover, McReynolds maintained, "The
Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
intended to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and
regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity

statute left maritime employers no worse off than they had been under the common law. Before the
statute's enactment, the plaintiff would have had a remedy at common law and a remedy in the admiralty; the statute merely substituted the workmen's compensation remedy for the common law remedy, leaving the maritime plaintiff with two remedies as he had had before. In both instances, where there were
two remedies, "there may be only one recovery. The Workmen's Compensation Law requires that the
claimant shall sign a release of any other right or cause and assign to the person or corporation liable for
such compensation all his right, title and interest in any cause of action." Brief of the New York State
Industrial Commission at 50-52. The maritime plaintiff's remedy in admiralty would thus be extinguished not by force of the state statute, but instead by a release executed in connection with the plaintiff's election to recover under the state statute.
6
Brief in Behalf of the State Industrial Commission of New York, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
p. 31.
62
New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
1244 U.S. at 212. The company had initially objected to the award on the ground "that the Act is
unconstitutional in that it violates Article 1II, Section 2, of the Constitution conferring admiralty jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States." That contention, which is distinct from the issue framed by
Justice McReynolds, does not appear to have been argued to and was not addressed by the New York
Court of Appeals, and was not raised before the Supreme Court.
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and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or
with foreign states."'
By the same token, however, it was clear that the power of Congress to
prescribe substantive maritime law was not exclusive, and that it might to
some extent be "changed, modified, or affected by state legislation."65 For
example, state law could impose a lien for repairs done to a vessel in her
home port,' and could as well create a cause of action for wrongful death
occurring in the admiralty.67 But "no such legislation is valid," McReynolds
declared, "if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of
Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity
of that law in its international and interstate relations."68 As applied to a maritime workplace injury, McReynolds concluded, the New York workmen's
compensation statute "conflicts with the Constitution and is to that extent
invalid."'69 For if New York could "subject foreign ships coming into her ports
to such obligations as those imposed by her Compensation Statute, other
States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of
the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution
was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and
with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded."7
While McReynolds did not take up the petitioner's claim that the New
York statute offended the dormant Commerce Clause, he was prepared to
rely upon analogy to that body of jurisprudence in order to leverage his innovative interpretation of Article III. "A similar rule in respect to interstate
commerce deduced from the grant to Congress of power to regulate it is now
firmly established," he observed. "'Where the subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the
States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation
of goods from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and
provide the needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress on the
subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be
free.' And the same character of reasoning which supports this rule, we

1244 U.S. at 215, quoting The Lottawanna, 81 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875).
"Id. at 216.
I1d. at 216, citing The Lottawanna, 81 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875), and The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S.
1(1892).
Id., citing The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
"Id.
61Id. at 218.
70Id. at 217.
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think, makes imperative the stated limitation upon the States to interpose
where maritime matters are involved. 7
Justice Pitney filed a learned and exhaustive dissent in which he rejected
McReynolds' analysis at virtually every turn. Initially, he greeted with skepticism McReynolds' attempt to conjure a kind of dormant Admiralty Clause
from an analogy to the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The majority opinion, Pitney observed, contended that "just as the absence
of an act of Congress regulating interstate commerce in some cases is equivalent to a declaration by Congress that commerce in that respect shall be
free, so non-action by Congress amounts to an imperative limitation upon
the power of the States to interpose where maritime matters are involved."7
"This view," Pitney maintained, "is so entirely unsupported by precedent,
and will have such far-reaching consequences, that it ought not to be accepted without the most thorough consideration."73 And after extremely thorough
consideration, Pitney concluded that "neither the Constitution nor the
Judiciary Act was intended to prescribe a system of substantive law to govern the several courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, much less to make
the rules of decision, prevalent in any one court, obligatory on others, exercising a distinct jurisdiction, or binding upon the courts of the states when
acting within the bounds of their respective jurisdictions."74 In Pitney's view,
Justice Bradley's opinion in The Lottawanna, the principal authority upon
which McReynolds relied for the uniformity requirement, referred solely to
the maritime law "as administered in the courts of admiralty," and did not
purport to prescribe rules of decision for courts of common law.7"
Pitney did not deny the power of Congress to prescribe preemptive substantive rules to govern the adjudication of maritime controversies. "I freely
concede the authority of Congress to modify the rules of maritime law so far
as they are administered in the federal courts, and to make them binding
upon the courts of the States so far as they affect interstate or international
relations," he wrote. But he maintained "that the Constitution does not, proprio vigore, impose the maritime law upon the states [except in cases of
prize and in rem ], and that as to civil actions in personamhaving a maritime
origin, the courts of the States are left free, except as Congress by
Legislation passed within its legitimate sphere of action may control them."76

7

Id.
' 2Id.
131d.
74
1d.
7
11d.
(1923).

at 216-17, quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 507-08 (1888).
at 224.
at 224-25.
at 237.
at 241. See Palfrey, The Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 778

76244 U.S. at 250-5 1.
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The relevant precedents seemed to Pitney to make this amply clear. The
Lottawanna had upheld the application of state statutory law to a maritime
lien for repairs. "It seems to be settled in our jurisprudence," Justice Bradley
had written, " that so long as Congress does not interpose to regulate the
subject, the rights of material-men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her
home port may be regulated in each State by State legislation."77 "It would
undoubtedly be far more satisfactory to have a uniform law regulating such
liens, but until such a law be adopted... the authority of the States to legislate on the subject seems to be conceded by the uniform course of decisions."78 The losing party in The Hamilton had proposed precisely the theory upon which McReynolds' opinion rested. "Next to the natural justice of
its principles," the petitioner had contended, "the highest value of the maritime law consists in its uniformity and general acceptance ...

that law is

not subject to the change or modification of state legislatures. Indeed, one of
the controlling reasons for conferring on the general government the exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty and maritime causes was to secure the
greatest benefits which must inevitably result from uniformity in the maritime law."79 The respondent had countered with The Lottawanna, the
pilotage cases, and the wrongful death cases,8" and Justice Holmes had written for a unanimous Court holding that the Delaware wrongful death statute
applied in the absence of congressional legislation on the subject.8 In
Pitney"s view, The Hamilton was "a controlling authority upon the question
now presented."82 "In the argument of the present case and companion
cases," he concluded, "emphasis was laid upon the importance of uniformity in applying and enforcing the rules of maritime law, because of their
affect upon interstate and foreign commerce. This, in my judgment, is a matter to be determined by Congress."83

Having dissected McReynolds' contention that the general maritime law
had preemptive effect on state law comparable to that of the dormant
Commerce Clause, Pitney next confronted the majority's dormant
Commerce Clause analogy. He noted pointedly that McReynolds had chosen not to rest the decision on the dormant Commerce Clause arguments outlined in the petitioner's brief. This he took to be a tacit concession "that in
the absence of applicable legislation by Congress the express grant of

1181 U.S. at 579.
7
lid. at 581.
11207 U.S. at 401.
'11d.
at 401-02.
'id. at 404.
82244 U.S. at 248.
'id. at 243.
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authority to regulate such commerce, as contained in the Constitution, does
not exclude the operation of the state [workmen's compensation] law." 84
Indeed, as Pitney made clear, maintaining the contrary would have been
utterly implausible. The pilotage and wrongful death cases were only the tip
of the iceberg.85 "In a great number and variety of cases," Pitney observed,
"state laws and policies incidentally affecting interstate carriers in their commercial operations have been sustained in this court, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress." Pitney offered numerous examples,86 but
the most trenchant concerned regulation of workplace accidents in interstate
commerce. "Certainly there is no greater need for uniformity of adjudication
in cases such as the present than in cases arising on land and affecting the
liability of interstate carriers to their employees," he asserted. "And,
although the Constitution contains an express grant to Congress of the power
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, nevertheless, until Congress
had acted, the responsibility of interstate carriers to their employees for
injuries arising in interstate commerce was controlled by the laws of the
States. This was because the subject was within the police power, and the
divergent exercise of that power by the States did not regulate, but only incidentally affected, commerce among the States."87 As Justice Hughes had
observed in his recent opinion in the Minnesota Rate Cases, "In some states
the so-called fellow-servant rule obtained; in others it had been abrogated
[by state statute]." Such "differences in the applicable laws created inequalities with respect to interstate transportation, but each State exercised the
power inherent in its territorial jurisdiction, and the remedy for the resulting

'id. at 251.

SId. at 245-47.
'"Lawsrequiring locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed by the state authorities; requiring such engineers to be examined for defective eyesight; requiring telegraph companies to receive dispatches and transmit and deliver them diligently; forbidding the running of freight trains on Sunday; regulating the heat of passenger cars; prohibiting a railroad company from obtaining by contract an exemption from the liability which would have existed had no contract been made.., statutes prohibiting the
transportation of diseased cattle in interstate commerce; statutes requiring the prompt settlement of
claims for loss or damage to freight, applied incidentally to interstate commerce... statutes regulating
the character of headlights used on locomotives ." "All of these cases affected the responsibility of interstate carriers." 244 U.S. at 244-45 (citations omitted). Moreover, it was "settled that a State, in the
absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, may construct dams and bridges across navigable streams
within its limits, notwithstanding an interference with accustomed navigation may result. So as to harbor
improvements; improvements and obstructions to navigation; [and] inspection and quarantine laws." Id.
at 246. See Conlen, supra note 45, at 931-32 (1928).
"Id. at 243-44. See Comment, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 145 (1917).
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diversity lay with Congress, which was free to substitute its own regulations."88 Indeed, "Until now," Pitney pointed out, "Congress has passed no
act concerning [interstate carriers'] responsibility for personal injuries sustained by passengers or strangers, or for deaths resulting from such injuries,
so that these matters still remain subject to the regulation of the several
States.'""9
In each of these cases, wrote Pitney, "the state regulation had an incidental effect upon the very conduct of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. If in such cases the States possess the power of regulation in the
absence of inconsistent action by Congress, much more clearly do they possess that power where Congress is silent, with respect to a liability which
arises... through the accidental injury or death of an employee engaged in
a maritime occupation."9 For "[slurely it cannot be that the mere grant of
judicial power in admiralty cases, with whatever general authority over the
subject matter can be raised by implication, can, in the absence of legislation, have greater effect in limiting the powers of the States than that which
resulted from the express grant to Congress of an authority to regulate interstate commerce." 9' After all, "the Constitution contains no express grant of
authority to establish rules of maritime law, and the authority must be
implied from the mere constitutional grant of judicial power over the subject
matter." To give the maritime law greater preemptive effect than the dormant
Commerce Clause was to give "a greater potency to an implied power than
to a power expressly conferred," a potency so great that it would "deprive the
several States of their police power over navigable waters lying wholly within their respective limits, and of their authority to regulate their intrastate
commerce so far as it is carried upon navigable waters."92
The majority opinion, as Pitney's dissent made clear, had in peculiar fashion sought to achieve through an analogy to the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence what it could not have achieved by relying on that

88230 U.S. 352, 409-10 (1913): "Interstate carriers, in the absence of a Federal statute providing a different rule, are answerable according to the law of the State for nonfeasance or misfeasance within its
limits. Until the enactment [of FELA], the laws of the States determined the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for injuries received by their employees while engaged in interstate commerce, and this
was because Congress, although empowered to regulate the subject, had not acted thereon."
89244 U.S. at 245.
9Id. at 247.
9
Id. at 251.
92
1d. at 251-52. This point is echoed in Fell, supra note 45, at 35. Fell, who understood Jensen to overrule Sherlock v. Ailing sub silentio, characterized McReynolds' "analogy to interstate commerce as an
argument.., an extremely unfortunate and ill conceived one." Id. In fact, McReynolds would soon write
an opinion following Sherlock in upholding application a state wrongful death statute to a maritime accident. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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jurisprudence directly. The minor premise of the syllogism-that workplace
accidents in domains subject to federal regulation were national in nature
and therefore could not be regulated by the state-was obviously in considerable tension with the weight of Commerce Clause precedent.93 The most
that could be said was that the major premise of the syllogism was familiar.
Some maritime matters were "national" in character and subject solely to
congressional regulation; other maritime matters (pilotage, wrongful death,
liens for home-port repairs) were "local" and could be regulated by the states
unless or until Congress had acted on the subject. 4
IV
DELEGATION AND UNIFORMITY IN COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
It would not be long, however, before the Commerce Clause analogy
would be placed under even further strain. In the autumn of 1917, Congress
enacted the Johnson Amendment to the saving clause, saving to suitors not
only common law remedies but also "rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State."95 The New York Court of Appeals
held the Johnson Amendment constitutional,96 but the Supreme Court
reversed by a vote of five to four. McReynolds again wrote for the majority,
further embellishing the Jensen rationale. "The Constitution," he reiterated,
"itself adopted and established, as part of the laws of the United States,
approved rules of general maritime law and empowered Congress to legislate in respect of them and other matters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. Moreover, it took from the States all power, by legislation or
judicial decision, to contravene the essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, characteristic features of such law or to interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations. To
preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime matters and bring them within control of the Federal Government was
the fundamental purpose; and to such definite end Congress was empowered
to legislate within that sphere."97 "The field was not left unoccupied; the
93

See Fell, supra note 45, at 24 (accusing McReynolds of having, "without any definitely expressed
reasoning, relegated the matter of workmen's compensation to the class of laws requiring national legislation and therefore prohibited to the States"); Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United
States (II), 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223, 249 (1925).
'The Commerce Clause analog to this rule, first articulated in Cooley, had been applied in variety of
cases from 1851 to the time that Jensen was decided. See Cushman, Formalism and Realism in
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089 (2000).
9140 Stat. 395.
"Stewart v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 123 N.E. 382 (N.Y. 1919).
'Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).
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Constitution itself adopted the rules concerning rights and liabilities applicable therein; and certainly these are not less paramount than they would
have been if enacted by Congress."98

After Jensen, this much, at least, was not surprising. But McReynolds
then proceeded to infer from this that the Johnson Amendment was "beyond
the power of Congress." The object of the grant to Congress of the power to
legislate concerning the rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction
and remedies for their enforcement "was to commit direct control to the
Federal Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish,
so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout
every part of the Union. Considering the fundamental purpose in view and
the definite end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that
in their characteristic features and essential international and interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended or changed except by legislation which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress. The
subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its discretion-not
for delegation to others ...

such an authorization would inevitably destroy

the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated
but actually established-it would destroy the very purpose of the grant." 9
The Johnson Amendment was thus unconstitutional because it delegated
congressional authority over a "national" admiralty matter to the states,
thereby authorizing them to disrupt the uniformity of regulation contemplated by the Constitution.
The Court's insistence that workmen's compensation legislation for maritime employees had to come from Congress rather than from the states rested uneasily next to decisions in which the justices had upheld federal
statutes allowing state legislation to apply in instances in which the dormant
Commerce Clause would otherwise have precluded diverse local regulation.
In 1890, the Court had held in Leisy v. Hardin that Iowa's prohibition on
sales of liquor could not constitutionally apply to beer that had been shipped
from Illinois and was still in its original package./° Interstate traffic in merchandise, explained Chief Justice Fuller, was a subject matter "national in its
character," which "must be governed by a uniform system." "The power
controlling it" was therefore "vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be

11d. at 161.
"Id. at 164.
1'w135 U.S. 100 (1890).
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encroached upon by the States.""' As it would in Jensen, the Court in Leisy
employed an engrafted uniformity requirement to divest the states of a regulatory jurisdiction they had long had reason to believe they might exercise.
Leisy overruled longstanding precedent"°2 and, like Jensen, it elicited a
vigorous dissent. 3 Like Jensen, Leisy provoked a firestorm of criticism in
the legal periodicals. l" But Leisy was unlike Jensen in one significant
respect. Whereas McReynolds' Jensen opinion offered no indication that
Congress might permit diverse local regulation of workplace injuries in the
admiralty jurisdiction, Fuller's Leisy opinion was peppered with suggestions
that Congress might remove the dormant Commerce Clause disability under

111d. at 109. See id. at 108-09 ("Where the subject matter requires a uniform system as between the
States, the power controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress"); id. at 109-10 ("interstate commerce,
consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national in its character,
and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or
allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled "); id. at 112 ("the transportation of passengers or of merchandise from one State to another is in
its nature national, admitting of but one regulatory power'); id. at 119 ('the grant of the power to regulate commerce among the States, so far as one system is required, is exclusive").
"The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
'"3See 135 U.S. at 125-60, dissenting opinion of Justices Gray, Brewer, and Harlan, relying, inter alia,
on Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
'Howland, The Police Power and Inter-State Commerce, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1890); Note, The
Original Package Case, 24 Am. L. Rev. 678, 682 (1890) ("Did the founders of the constitution ever intend
that certain foreign manufacturers and dealers in deleterious substances should have rights of commerce
therein which should override the local law of other States? It is difficult to see how any one who has
even a tolerable knowledge of the constitution and its history can come to such a conclusion. The subject is thrown into the clearest light by the masterly dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gray, which is a
complete refutation of the extraordinary position taken by the majority"); Note, Original Packages:
Constitutionality of the Wilson Law, 25 Am. L. Rev. 651, 652 (1891) (it "remains a source of profound
regret that the decision in Leisy v. Hardin was ever pronounced"); Snider, Growth of State Power Under
Federal Constitution to Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors, 25 W. Va. L. Q. 42, 49 (1917); Foster,
What Is Left of the Original Package Doctrine, I So. L. Q. 303, 318 (1916) (Leisy sacrificed "the more
vital concerns of government to a barren concept of the need of uniformity in determining articles of
national commerce"); J. Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation With the States Under the Commerce Clause
74-77 (1942); Bruce, The Wilson Act and the Constitution, 21 Green Bag 211-13, 215, 220-23 (1909).
This criticism had been anticipated in congressional debates over the Wilson Act. See, e.g., 21 Cong.
5086-88 (remarks of Sen. Evarts); id. at 5325-30 (remarks of Sen. George); id. at 5379 (remarks of Sen.
Pugh); id. at 5382 (remarks of Sen. Call); id. at 5383 (remarks of Sen. Pierce: "a somewhat singular phase
of this discussion is the practical unanimity with which Senators regret the decision of the Supreme Court
and desire to relieve it of its unfortunate consequences if only they can do so without violating the
Constitution themselves"); App. at 435-37 (remarks of Mr. Culberson); App. at 493-95 (remarks of Mr.
Rogers); App. at 461 (remarks of Mr. Wike: "nine-tenths of both Houses of Congress condemn this latest decision as unwarranted"); App. at 491 (remarks of Mr. Cummings); App. at 507 (remarks of Mr.
Breckenridge); App. at 517-18 (remarks of Mr. LaFollette); App. at 518 (remarks of Mr. Picker).
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which the states' liquor regulation laws otherwise labored.," Congress
accepted the invitation to do so later that same year. The Wilson Act provided that alcoholic beverages transported into any State or Territory "shall,
upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect
of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police
powers," even if the beverages remained in their original packages and
would therefore otherwise be subject to exclusive congressional control.'"
The bill provoked a vigorous and exhaustive debate in Congress, at the
center of which were claims by opponents that the bill delegated the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce to the states and thereby
authorized disuniformity in the regulation of interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution. 01 "Congress can not delegate any of its exclusive
constitutional powers to any of the States," argued Senator Vest of Missouri.
"For it to do so here would be to destroy the interstate-Commerce Clause of
the Constitution and all the purposes for which it was enacted originally, and
so far from having uniformity we should have diversity and hostility . . .
there would be chaos from one end of the Union to the other."10 8 Whereas
"the very object of this clause in the Constitution was to create uniformity,"
the Wilson bill "would destroy all uniformity."'" Such a delegation, agreed
Senator Coke of Texas, would result in the "destruction" of "symmetry and
uniformity.""' "Uniformity in the exercise of every branch of power that is

"See id. at 108 ("a subject matter which has been exclusively confided to Congress by the
Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, unless placed there by congressional action"); id. at 109-10: ("interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale
and exchange of commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so
long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates
its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled"); id. 110: ("importation cannot be prohibited without the consent of Congress"); id. at 114 (a state "cannot, without the consent of Congress,
express or implied, regulate commerce between its people and those of other States of the Union"); id.
at 119 ( "as the grant of the power to regulate commerce among the States, so far as one system is
required, is exclusive, the States cannot exercise that power without the assent of Congress"); id. at 12324("the responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regulation of interstate commerce is concerned, to
remove the restriction upon the State in dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits").
'°26 Stat. 313 (1890). There was some precedent for legislation of this sort. See 1 Stat. 54 (1789),
authorizing the continued operation of existing state pilotage laws; I Stat. 474 (1796) and I Stat. 619
(1799), consenting to the enforcement of state quarantine laws; 14 Stat. 81 (1866), authorizing state regulation and exclusion of interstate shipments of explosives; 10 Stat. 112 (1852), authorizing construction
of a bridge across the Ohio River; 13 Stat. 99 (1864), permitting nondiscriminatory state taxation of
national bank shares. See Kallenbach, supra note 104, at 79-80, 342-65.
'"'See, e.g., H. Rept. 2604 (51-1), Views of the Minority, pp. 7, 9; 21 Cong. Rec. 4955-61, 4965-66,
5425-28 (remarks of Sen. Vest); id. at 5324-25 (remarks of Sen. Coke); Id. at 5330-32 (remarks of Sen.
Eustis); id. at 5378 (remarks of Sen. Faulkner).
'121 Cong. Rec. at 4957.
'mId. at 4966.
"Id. at 5324.
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confided to the Congress of the United States, seems to be a constitutional
prerequisite of its exercise, and it ought to be," maintained Senator Morgan
of Alabama, and "the bill before us now ... can not possibly have a gener-

al and uniform bearing among the States of the American Union."" I
Charles Rahrer challenged the constitutionality of the Wilson Act in two
briefs filed with the Supreme Court at its 1890 Term."2 In each, he offered
an extensive attack on the Act as a delegation of congressional authority giving rise to a lack of uniformity."3 Leisy had held that the interstate liquor
trade was commerce of a national character requiring a uniform system of
regulation. The authority to regulate such commerce being vested exclusively in Congress, Rahrer maintained, the Wilson Act's authorization of
state regulation of the subject constituted "a license to violate the constitution.""' 4 Moreover, such a delegation produced a lack of uniformity, which
5
"is an indispensable requisite of the regulation of inter-State commerce."'
Justice Johnson had remarked in Gibbons v. Ogden that, under the Articles
of Confederation, there had grown up "a conflict of commercial regulations
destructive to the harmony of the States." Johnson had observed that "a resolution of Virginia, appointing her commissioners to meet commissioners
from other States, expresses their purpose to be, 'to take into consideration
the trade of the United States, to consider how far a uniform system in the

"1d. at 5369. These criticisms were echoed in the House debate. See id. at 7488-89 (remarks of Mr.
Chipman); App. at 436-37 (remarks of Mr. Culberson); App. at 493-94 (remarks of Mr. Rogers); App. at
462 (remarks of Mr. Wike); App. at 482 (remarks of Mr. Frank); App. at 491-92 (remarks of Mr.
Cummings); App. at 507 (remarks of Mr. Breckenridge); H. Rept. 2604 (5 1-1) (Views of the Minority)
at 4-7, 9. Such sentiments also found expression in contemporary law review commentary. See Note,
Constitutionality of the Wilson Law, 25 Am. L. Rev. 107, 108-09 (1891) (discussing "the fallacy of the
doctrine that Congress can confer power upon the States"); Spear, The Senate Liquor Bill, 41 Albany L.
J. 473 ("Either the States can or they cannot constitutionally legislate within the domain of foreign and
interstate commerce. If they can do so, then they need no permissive act by Congress to give them this
power; and if they cannot do so, it is difficult to see how Congress can, by a mere legislative definition,
enable them to do what the Constitution, by necessary implication, says that they shall not do"); Note,
The Original Package Case, 24 Am. L. Rev. 678, 680-81 (1890) ("It is a fundamental principle of
American constitutional law . . . that legislative power cannot be delegated ....

Upon what principle,

then, can Congress delegate to the States any portion of the legislative authority which has been committed to it by the constitution, to be exclusively exercised by it?"); Merrill, Regulation of Interstate
Commerce by the States, 50 Cent. L. J. 25, 28-29 (1900); Bruce, The Wilson Act and the Constitution,
21 Green Bag 211, 216-18 (1909).
"'Brief for Appellee, filed by David Overmyer (hereinafter "Overmyer Brief'); Brief for Appellee,
filed by Louis J. Blum and Edgar C. Blum (hereinafter "Blum Brief').
"3See Blum Brief, pp. 3-5, 7, 17-18, 25-55; Overmyer Brief, pp. 4, 6, 15-46.
"'Blum Brief at 3-4. See also id. at 7, 17-18, 25-55; Overmyer Brief at 15-17, 21, 25, 29-36, 43-46.
"'Overmyer Brief at 19. See also id. at 17 ("all regulation of inter-State commerce must be by
Congress itself, must express the will of Congress, and must be uniform throughout the country"), 18,
21, 22, 25, 42-43.

January 2001

Lochner,Liquor & Longshoremen

commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interests and
their permanent harmony.' And Mr. Madison's resolution, which led to that
measure, is introduced by a preamble entirely explicit to this point:
'Whereas, the relative situation of the United States has been found, on trial,
to require uniformity in their commercial regulations .... "1 As the incentive for taking the power to regulate interstate commerce "away from the
States and conferring it on Congress was to promote and secure to the people of all the States enlarged and uniform commercial intercourse," Rahrer
insisted, "it was contemplated by the framers of the constitution that any law
enacted by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred should be uniform in its operation."" 7 Bearing this in mind, Rahrer inquired, "Can
Congress, under the guise of limiting the effect of the regulations of commerce between the several States, so legislate as to transfer the control of
inter-State transportation, which it is agreed on all hands is a thing national
in its character, and requiring and admitting of but one uniform system or
plan of regulation-can Congress, under any possible pretext, so legislate as
to transfer the control of this feature of commerce to the varying regulations
which would be suggested by the numberless interests, whims, caprices and
passions of the forty-two States of this Union?""'
Apparently so. The Court unanimously rebuffed Rahrer's delegation and
uniformity arguments." 9 As had the bill's proponents in Congress, the
Justices of the Supreme Court refused to concede that the Act delegated congressional authority. In enacting the Wilson Act, wrote Chief Justice Fuller,
"Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate interstate
commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or to grant a
power not possessed by the States, or to adopt state laws. It has taken its own
course and made its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate
commerce one common rule, whose uniformity is not affected by variations
in state laws dealing with such property.""'2 "Congress did not use terms of
permission to the States to act, but simply removed an impediment to the
enforcement of the state laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part."''
The issue did not die there. A series of narrow constructions of the Wilson
Act soon prompted a drive for more effective regulation of the interstate

"Overmyer Brief at 38, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)l, 225 (1824).
'Id. at 40.
"Ild at 6.
"'In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). Justices Harlan, Gray and Brewer, who had dissented in Leisy,
"concurred in the judgment of reversal, but not in all the reasoning of the opinion of the court." Id. at 565.
2
ld. at 561.
2
' Id. at 564.
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liquor trade.'22 These efforts culminated in 1913 with the enactment of the
Webb-Kenyon Act, prohibiting shipment of booze into any state in which it
was intended to be received, possessed or sold in violation of state law.'23
The statute contained no penalty for its violation, and it was, as its title indicated, simply "An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases." Opponents again characterized the bill as an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the several states.'24 ThenSenator George Sutherland of Utah offered the principal constitutional argument in opposition to the bill.'25 "I sympathize," he began, "quite as much as
the proponents of this measure with all practicable efforts which have as
their object the curtailment or the prevention of the evils which we all concede follow from the use of intoxicating liquors. If I had the power to do so
by my single pronouncement I would consign every drop of intoxicating
liquor to the bottom of the ocean, because I believe that humanity would be
far better off without it." But it was "necessary not only that a proposed
piece of legislation should be wise and just, but under our form of government it is necessary that it should be in harmony with the Constitution of the
United States."'26 And the proposed bill was out of harmony with the
Constitution in two key respects. First, it was "a clear delegation of the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." And second, the bill
"would necessarily result in a multitude of differing and conflicting systems
of regulation, and this would subvert the whole intent, spirit, and purpose of
the commerce clause, which is essentially to establish a uniform system."'27
Attorney General Wickersham agreed. The Webb-Kenyon bill, he opined,
"does not prohibit as a uniform rule [liquor's] carriage in interstate commerce. It proposes to turn over the whole subject to the conflicting laws of
"2See Hamm, supra note 2, 175-220.
'2337 Stat. 699.
2

See 49 Cong. Rec. 2899-2900 (1913) (remarks of Sen. Pomerene) ("This is not a question of the
prohibition of the liquor traffic by Congress nor is it a regulation by Congress. The purpose is to have
Congress delegate the power to the several general assemblies of the country to make such police regulations as to them may seem proper relative to the inspection and seizure of intoxicating liquors in interstate trade." The bill was "an effort to delegate or, if not to delegate, to abdicate the power which the people gave to the Federal Government over interstate commerce and leave it subject to the will of the several States and localities therein."); 49 Cong. Rec. 2915 (remarks of Sen. Root) ("What is proposed in
this bill is that the Government of the United States shall hand over to the government of each State the
right to say how and when and under what conditions interstate commerce in these articles of commerce,
so treated and regarded by all the States, shall be had"); H. Rept. 1461 (62-3), Part II, p. 8; remarks of
Sen. Paynter of Kentucky, 49 Cong. Rec. 2687-91; remarks of Sen. Pomerene of Ohio, 49 Cong. Rec.
2899-2903; remarks of Mr. Stanley of Kentucky, 49 Cong. Rec. 4434-39; remarks of Mr. Hardwick of
Georgia, 49 Cong. Rec. 4446. The delegation objection was similarly raised in debates over comparable
bills introduced in previous sessions. See Hamm, supra note 2, at 206-09 (1995).
" See 49 Cong. Rec. 2903-11.
6
11 Id. at 2903.
Id. at 2904.
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48 States." This was "not directly to exercise the power to regulate commerce in liquors but to abdicate it, and to submit the whole question in traffic in liquors to the varying decisions of the different States."' 28 Three years
later, Wickersham would describe the Webb-Kenyon Act "as a striking
example of legislation resulting from confused ideas of sovereignty . . . an
attempt by Congress to abdicate a clear constitutional power vested in it and
129
in effect delegate a portion of its own legislative powers to the states."
President William Howard Taft, who as Chief Justice would later join
Justice Sutherland in the Dawson majority, vetoed the bill on that very
ground. "After giving this proposed enactment full consideration," he wrote
in his veto message, "I believe it to be a violation of the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution, in that it is in substance and effect a delegation
by Congress to the States of the power of regulating interstate commerce in
liquors which is vested exclusively in Congress."
One of the main purposes of the union of the States under the Constitution was
to relieve the commerce between the States of the burdens which local State
jealousies and purposes had in the past imposed upon it; and the inter-state
commerce clause in the Constitution was one of the chief reasons for its adoption. The power was there conferred upon Congress. Now, if to the discretion
of Congress is committed the question whether in interstate commerce we shall
return to the old methods prevailing before the Constitution or not, it would
seem to be conferring upon congress the power to amend the Constitution by
ignoring or striking out one of its most important provisions. It was certainly
intended by that clause to secure uniformity in the regulation of commerce
between the States. To suspend that purpose and to permit the States to exercise their old authority before they became States, to interfere with commerce
between them and their neighbors, is to defeat the constitutional purpose.'30
As late as 1913 there was considerable, respectable opinion holding that federal legislation authorizing state regulation of interstate transactions violated
uniformity and nondelegation constraints governing exercises of the com-

merce power.'3
' 8Opinion of Hon. George W. Wickersham of New York, Appointed March 5, 1909, Department of
Justice, Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate
Character
in Certain Cases, 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 88 (February 28, 1913).
2
1Wickersham, Confused Sovereignty, 1Ill. L. Rev. 225, 236 (1916).
'349 Cong. Rec. 4291-92 (emphasis added).
"'See also Kerr, The Webb Act, 22 Yale L. J. 567, 579-81 (1913) (Congress has provided in the WebbKenyon Act "that the United States will permit any State to exercise the prerogative of the United States
and deprive liquor of its interstate attributes and thus enable it to enforce its local laws. In doing so it
clearly delegated its sovereign power over commerce to the individual States, a thing which it as clearly
is unable to do"); Note, 17 Col. L. Rev. 145, 146-47 (1917) (it "seems fundamental that if Congress cannot enlarge the powers of the state by directly delegating power, itcannot do so indirectly"); Rogers,
Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Before the Webb-Kenyon Act, 4 Va. L. Rev. 288, 304
(1917). For a defense of the Act against the charge of delegation, see Snider, supra note 104, at 54-55
(1917); McGovney, The Webb-Kenyon Law and Beyond, 3 Iowa Law Bull. 145, 151-52 (1917).
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When Congress voted to override Taft's veto,'32 the question of the Act's
constitutionality passed to the courts. By the time that question had come to
the Supreme Court of the United States, however, it was evident that the
Act's opponents did not anticipate a favorable ruling. When Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.'33 was initially argued at the 1914 Term, the
company's brief devoted fewer than two of its seventy-one pages to the
claim that the Act constituted an unlawful delegation of congressional power
to the states.'34 At the 1915 Term's reargument, the Appellant's brief focused
solely on its principal statutory construction claims, and again made no
claim that exercises of the commerce power must produce uniformity.'3 5 For
the 1914 Term, the State of West Virginia devoted fewer than four pages of
its brief to the delegation issue, most of which consisted of an extensive quotation from a Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the Act.'36 Content to rely on
Rahrer,the state made no mention of the uniformity issue.37 When the case
was reargued, the state's brief devoted fewer than three of its eighty-seven
pages to the delegation issue, and again said nothing whatever about uniformity. As counsel maintained, the Webb-Kenyon Act had "been declared constitutional and valid by every State Supreme Court, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, and all of the upper courts in the State and Federal government which have passed upon its constitutionality."'38 An amicus brief
filed in the 1915 Term by the attorneys general of fifteen states remarked
that "[t]he assault upon the Webb-Kenyon Bill by counsel for the appellant
in the former brief is so weak and so meagre, that we cannot think that counCong. Rec. 4299, 4447.
U.S. 311 (1917).
"Brief for Appellant, October Term, 1914, pp. 69-70.
"'Brief for Appellant on Reargument, October Term, 1915.
"36West Virginia v. Adams Express Co., 219 F. 794, 802 (41 Cir. 1915).
"'Brief for the State of West Virginia, Appellee (submitted by Fred 0. Blue), October Term, 1914, pp.
18-22. In a second brief filed that term, counsel for the state had similarly been content to dispose of the
delegation question with a brief quotation from Rahrer. Brief for the State of West Virginia, Appellee
(submitted by W.B. Wheeler), October Term, 1914, pp. 25-26.
"'Brief for State of West Virginia, Appellee (submitted by W.B. Wheeler), October Term, 1915, pp.
8-9, citing, inter alia, Southern Express Co. v. State, 66 So. 115 (Ala. 1914); Southern Express Co. v.
Whittle, 69 So. 652 (Ala. 1915); West Va. v. Adams Express Co., 219 F. 794 (41 Cir. 1915); State v.
Seaboard A.L. Ry., 84 S.E. 283 (N.C. 1915); Glenn v. Southern Express Co., 87 S.E. 136 (N.C. 1915);
State v. Doe, 139 P. 1169 (Kan. 1914); Am. Express Co. v. Beer, 65 So. 575 (Miss. 1914); United States
v. Oregon & Wash. R. & Nav. Co., 210 F 378 (D. Ore. 1913); Van Winkle v. Delaware, 91 A. 385 (Del.
1914); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 85 S.E. 499 (Va. 1915); Atkinson v. Southern Express Co., 78 S.E. 516
(S.C. 1913); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 169 S.W. 603 (Ky. 1914). See also Brief for State of West
Virginia, Appellee (submitted by Fred 0. Blue), October Term, 1915, pp. 53-55 (essentially reproducing
his argument of the preceding year); and Brief for State of West Virginia, Appellee (submitted by W.B.
Wheeler), October Term, 1914, pp. 39-40, citing additional state cases upholding the Act, including Ex
parte Peede, 170 S.W. 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914); State v. United States Express Co., 145 N.W. 451
(Iowa 1914); and Palmer v. Southern Express Co., 165 S.W. 236 (Tenn. 1913).
349
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sel had any serious expectation of having the Webb-Kenyon Law declared to
be invalid."' 39 By 1916, the state's reply brief simply observed that "[t]he last
brief filed [for the appellant] gives the impression that opposing counsel
have lost faith in the efficacy of their argument against the constitutionality
40
of the Webb-Kenyon law."'
Chief Justice White's opinion for the Court in Clark Distillingdisposed of
the delegation argument in two sentences. "The argument as to delegation to
the States rests upon a mere misconception," he wrote. "It is true that the
regulation which the Webb-Kenyon Act contains permits state prohibitions
to apply to movements of liquor from one State into another, but the will
which causes the prohibitions to be applicable is that of Congress, since the
application of state prohibitions would cease the instant the act of Congress
ceased to apply."' 4' Much the same might have been said of the Johnson
Amendment. If Jensen barred state regulation of workplace accidents in the
admiralty jurisdiction, then state workers compensation statutes could have
no application should Congress repeal the amendment. The will that caused
the state statutes to be applicable was that of Congress.
White employed a comparable conceptual strategy in finessing the uniformity issue. 42 "So far as uniformity is concerned, there is no question that
the act uniformly applies to the conditions which call its provisions into
play-that its provisions apply to all the States,-so that the question really
is a complaint as to the want of uniform existence of things to which the act

"'Brief filed by permission of the court, on behalf of the State of West Virginia, appellee, by the
Attomeys-General (as amici curiae) of the several states as shown at the end of the brief, October Term,
1915, p. 15. See Rogers, The Virginia Prohibition Law and the Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution, 3 Va. L. Rev. 483, 489 (1916) ("it would be surprising should the Supreme Court agree with
President Taft ...and declare that Congress did not have the authority to pass the measure. Such a decision would overrule the opinions of twelve state and several federal courts"); Roberts, State Legislation
Under the Webb-Kenyon Act, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 225, 226 (1915) (while the constitutionality of the Act
had not yet "been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, little doubt exists, I take it,
that the decision there will be favorable").
"Reply Brief for the State of West Virginia, Appellee, October Term, 1916, p. 2. This brief cited additional intervening cases in which state courts had sustained the Act. See id. at pp. 7-12, citing inter alia,
Gottstein v. Lister, 153 P. 595 (Wash. 1915); State v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 152 P. 777 (Mo. 1915); Brennan
v. Southern Express Co., (S.C. 1915) [sic].
11l242 U.S. at 326.

'4Kallenbach notes that "[c]ontemporary comment upon the Webb-Kenyon decision, though expressing approval of the result reached, was generally critical of the reasoning advanced by the Court."
Kallenbach, supra note 104, at 232, n. 106. See Orth, The Webb-Kenyon Law Decision, 2 Cornell L. Q.
283, 292-93, 298 (1917); Rogers, The Webb-Kenyon Decision, 4 Va. L. Rev. 558, 570 (1917); Powell,
Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 So. L. Q. 113 (1917). Other critical treatments of the Court's handling of the delegation issue include Dowling & Hubbard, Divesting an Article
of Its Interstate Character, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 100, 116-19 (1921). The authors applauded the result in Clark
Distilling, but thought the more defensible course to be overruling Leisy. See 5 Minn. L. Rev. 253, 27781 (1921).
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applies and not to an absence of uniformity in the act itself."' Again, the
same might have been said of the 1917 amendment. The amendment's provisions applied to all of the states. Employers might object that there was
variation among the states concerning the existence and details of workers
compensation legislation, but that was "a complaint as to the want of uniform existence of things to which the act applies, and not to an absence of
uniformity in the act itself." Just as Jensen had held that application of state
workers' compensation statutes to injuries occurring in the admiralty jurisdiction disrupted the proper uniformity of the law of admiralty, Leisy had
invalidated state regulation of interstate transportation of liquor because the
subject fell into that category of commerce national in character and therefore requiring a uniform system of regulation. But as White observed at
length, in the Commerce Clause context the need for uniformity disabled
only the states, not Congress. Leisy "in the most explicit terms declared that
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce in intoxicants
embraced the right to subject such movement to state prohibitions"-that
Congress might remove the dormant Commerce Clause disability under
which the states otherwise labored. '" Congress had relied on these declarations in enacting the Wilson Act, and the Court had reaffirmed them in
Rahrer and subsequent decisions.'45 Longstanding precedent clearly shielded the Act from any contention that it was invalid for want of uniformity.
"But aside from this," White continued, "it is obvious that the argument
seeks to engraft upon the Constitution a restriction not found in it, that is,
that the power to regulate conferred upon Congress obtains subject to the
requirement that regulations enacted shall be uniform throughout the United
States."'46
Little wonder, then, that the Johnson Amendment had sailed through
Congress with no constitutional debate and without a dissenting vote.'47
Learned Hand, who was not stupid, thought that Clark Distilling provided
ample and dispositive authority for the 1917 amendment. In The Howell,'
he considered "whether the act of Congress was valid which submitted the
rules of the sea, not only to existing state laws, but to possible future changes
determined only by the will of the states." "Since Clark Distilling,"he concluded, "I can hardly think that the question is serious. That case determined
111242 U.S. at 326-27.
'lId. at 327-29.
'"lId. at 329-30.
6
111d. at 327.
" 7S. Rept. 139 (65-1) consisted of one page. There was no House Report. Discussion of the bill in
both the Senate and the House occupied less than one page in the Congressional Record. 55 Cong. Rec.
7605-06; id. at 7843.
s257 F. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
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that, as to matters over which Congress has jurisdiction, it might permit state
legislation even prospectively until such time as in its own pleasure it should
choose to assume explicit legislative control."" 9 A writer in the Southern
Law Review agreed: "Any objection on the ground that this is an invalid delegation of power by Congress to the states, is foreclosed by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Clark Distilling Company v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co., in which the constitutionality of the WebbKenyon Act was upheld, despite the objection that Congress had thereby delegated to the states the power of prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquors from other states into their boundaries, which was vested in
Congress by the federal constitution." 5 "[O]n strictly legal grounds," wrote
another commentator, "the Clark Distilling Case will support the constitutionality of the amendment of the saving clause as far as the adoption of
' 5
prospective legislation is concerned. ' '
The argument was presented in its most complete form in an amicus brief
filed by Warren Pillsbury on behalf of the Industrial Accident Commission of
California in Knickerbocker Ice. Pillsbury's objective was to sustain the
Commerce Clause analogy suggested by McReynolds' Jensen opinion. "The
close parallel between the power to legislate under the Commerce Clause
concerning injuries sustained by employees in interstate commerce, and
under the implied grant of power over maritime law to legislate concerning
injuries sustained by employees in maritime employments," Pillsbury maintained, "is directly in point." "Under the commerce clause," he reminded the
Court, "the States have had full authority to legislate concerning injuries sustained by employees in interstate commerce (typically railroad employees)
until Congress acts." Until the passage of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, "[s]tate legislation in the field was of unquestioned validity."'52 But there
was no need to revisit the question of state power in the absence of congressional action, for here Congress had acted. Pillsbury could accordingly content himself with a more modest claim for state power to regulate maritime
workplace injuries. "If the States may exercise such power for interstate

11ld. at 579-80.
5

Note, State Workmen's Compensation Laws-Act of Congress of October 6, 1917, 3 So. L. Q. 76,
78 (1918). "It issubmitted that there can be no question of the constitutionality of this act. It is true that
the decision in the Jensen case was based on the ground that the adoption of article 3 of ...the federal
constitution incorporated into our national law the general system of maritime law and precluded any
state from altering the characteristic features of that law; but it cannot be said that by the adoption of that
provision congress was precluded from making such changes in maritime law as it saw fit. Congress
could undoubtedly have enacted a compensation act for seamen engaged in work of a maritime nature;
and it can, therefore, authorize the states to exercise this power." Id. at 77-78.
5
' Fell, supra note 45, at 48. See also Kallenbach, supra note 104, at 370-72.
52
' Amicus Brief, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, at 16.
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injuries under the silence of Congress," Pillsbury insisted, "they can exercise
'
similar power over maritime injuries with the express consent of Congress."53
It was here that Pillsbury sought to make the most of McReynolds' citation to Clark Distilling and other liquor regulation cases in his Jensen opinion. "The silence of Congress with respect to State participation in maritime
matters is deemed equivalent, in view of the necessity for uniformity, to a
declaration by Congress that the field shall remain free from State interference." It followed from this "that Congress has power to make a declaration
either for or against concurrent power by the State, else its presumed intent,
deduced from its silence, would be immaterial. If Congress were powerless
to authorize state participation," then the citation to Clark Distilling in
Jensen "would be entirely irrelevant.""'5 "The reference in the Jensen case to
the grant to Congress of power to regulate commerce" was "conclusive of
the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment." There the Court had
placed "the power of the States to regulate the movement of articles in interstate commerce, and to regulate maritime injuries, upon exactly the same
footing."' 5 Leisy had held the states powerless to regulate interstate commerce in liquor in the absence of congressional action. The Wilson Act had
made liquor subject to state regulation upon arrival in the state, and the
Court had upheld the Act in Rahrer "notwithstanding the contentions there
made that the act amounted to a delegation of Federal legislative power to
the States, and disregarded the uniformity desired by the Constitution to be
secured by Federal control of interstate commerce." The Webb-Kenyon Act
had extended the regulatory power of the states over the interstate liquor
trade, and the Court had sustained the act against similar contentions in
Clark Distilling. Pillsbury maintained that the citation of the booze precedents in Jensen indicated that the Court "believed Congress to have such
power with respect to maritime injuries, as it held the same character of reasoning to be applicable in both cases."' 56 "Congress has power to return to
the State jurisdiction over a portion of interstate commerce otherwise exclusively Federal," Pillsbury concluded, citing Rahrer and Clark Distilling.'57
"The close parallel between the Johnson Amendment and the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts, relinquishing to the State a portion of the Federal legislative field, is directly in point. The latter having been held constitutional,
58
the former must be.'

'53Id. at 14-15.
15 1d. at 27.
'"Id.at 28.

"'Id. at 29-30. See also id. at 36.
1111d.
at 16.
'1Id. at 15.
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That's what you think, replied Justice McReynolds, who seemed fully satisfied that he had utterly demolished this position with only a few laconic
declarative sentences. "The distinction between the indicated situation created by the Constitution relative to maritime affairs and the one resulting
from the mere grant of power to regulate commerce without more,"
McReynolds cautioned, "should not be forgotten."'' 9 Yet the precise nature
of that distinction remained elusive. 6 ' McReynolds dealt with Rahrer merely by citing it for the proposition that "Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States-by nature this is non-delegable."'' Allowing the
reader no time to recover from this, he then promptly turned to Clark
Distilling,pointing out that its reasoning "proceeded upon the postulate that
because of the peculiar nature of intoxicants which gives enlarged power
concerning them, Congress might go so far as entirely to prohibit their
transportation in interstate commerce. The statute did less."'62 This explanation helped little to illuminate his earlier unelaborated assertion that "[tio
say that because Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it could authorize the States to do so as they might
desire, is false reasoning."'63 If Congress could divest interstate transactions
in liquor of their interstate character so that state law might apply, why could
it not similarly divest maritime workplace accidents of their maritime character so that state workmen's compensation statutes might apply?
The dissenting Justices simply could not comprehend it. Justice Holmes,
who had dissented without opinion in Clark Distilling,remarked, "I thought
that [Clark Distilling] went pretty far in justifying the adoption of state legislation in advance, as I cannot for a moment believe that apart from the
Eighteenth Amendment special constitutional principles exist against strong
drink. The fathers of the Constitution so far as I know approved it."'" Justice
Brandeis attacked the assumption "that Congress, which has power to make
and to unmake the general maritime law, can have no voice in determining
which of its provisions require adaption to peculiar local needs and as to
which absolute uniformity is an essential of the proper harmony of international and interstate maritime relations. This assumption has no support in
reason; and it is inconsistent (at least in principle) with the powers conferred
upon Congress in other connections. The grant 'of the.., judicial power...
t59253 U.S. at 161.
"As one commentator put it, "Considerable difficulty was encountered by the Court in distinguishing the effect of [the Johnson Amendment] from a similar result obtained by the Webb-Kenyon Act." Fell,
supra note 45, at 47.
161253 U.S. at 164.
'6231d. at 165.
'6 1d. at 164. Perhaps he meant "false consciousness."
'6 d.at 169.
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to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' is, surely, no broader in
terms than the grant of power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States.' Yet as to commerce," he observed with citations to
Rahrer and Clark Distilling, "Congress may, at least in large measure, determine whether uniformity of regulation is required or diversity is permissible.''

65

V
CONTEMPORARY ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE ASYMMETRY
Why, then, could Congress not do in admiralty what it could do with
respect to interstate commerce? Some observers thought that the same uniformity and non-delegation rules applied in both Commerce Clause and
admiralty jurisprudence, and that the liquor cases were simply aberrational.
As one commentator on Knickerbocker Ice put it, "The commerce clause
cases, however, are explainable as manifestations of a tendency to uphold
legislation regulating the liquor traffic which would be invalid if applied to
' This was
ordinary commodities." 66
the view taken by the Supreme Court of
California in an opinion invalidating the Johnson Amendment in early 1920.
"The United States supreme court has shown an unmistakable inclination to
uphold restriction upon traffic in liquor without openly declaring that liquor
was not an ordinary article of commerce," observed Judge Lennon. "In so
doing, the court has resorted to applications of constitutional principles
which would not have been applied in like manner to uphold restrictions
upon traffic in lumber or cotton which were similar in their scope and effect
....

The difference between the character of the Webb-Kenyon Act and the

[Johnson Amendment], as well as the difference between the subjects of
which these two laws treat, is manifest. The one deals with certain property
the abuse of which is a menace to society. The other deals with ships (of
whose vital importance to the welfare and even to the life of the nation the
recent war furnishes a vivid reminder) .... [Tihe subject matters of the two
enactments which respondents seek to link together are so vitally and patently different in nature, purpose, history, -and circumstance that we find it
impossible to conceive that the question of the constitutionality of one is con'
clusively determined by the ruling on the constitutionality of the other."67
The amicus brief of the California Industrial Accident Commission in
Knickerbocker Ice offered a cogent response to the distinction proposed by
that state's court of last resort: "If it be argued that the constitutionality of
'ODawson, 264 U.S. at234 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" Comment, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 82 (1920).
6
" Sudden & Christenson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 188 P. 803, 806 (Cal. 1920).
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the Webb-Kenyon act depends solely upon the peculiar character of the articles of commerce regulated, i.e., intoxicating liquors, and that such holding
is not an authority for any other case involving the relinquishment to the
States of a portion of Federal jurisdiction, the answer is twofold:
(1.) The power of Congress necessarily depends upon general rules. This
court cannot legislate exceptions based upon specific articles of commerce. The decision must therefore stand upon the proposition that
Congress has power to relinquish to the States in its discretion any portion of the field of regulation of interstate commerce in which the State
is directly interested as a matter of self-protection.
(2.) Alcoholic liquors and industrial injuries are in the same class in any
event for the purpose of prevention and redress by State statutes, as
both affect the social welfare of the State by rendering a certain portion of its residents economic liabilities instead of economic assets,
and tending to make such residents and their families a burden upon
States charities and institutions. The redress of both is within the police
power of the State as a matter of self-protection."' 6
In other words, the constitutional explanation for the validity of the
Wilson and Webb Kenyon Acts was not that alcohol was sui generis, but
instead that the prohibition of its sale, like that of other substances posing a
danger to the health, safety and morals of the community, was a legitimate
exercise of state police power. The Johnson Amendment did not regulate
ships, as the California court would have it, but instead workplace injuries.
And the Court had already upheld their regulation by the New York
Workmen's Compensation Act as a legitimate exercise of the state's police

power.69
Whatever the merits of the claim that the liquor regulation cases were sui
generis, it did not prove to be an accurate guide to future Commerce Clause
decisions. Such "booze is different" arguments were made in Congress and
before the Court when Congress enacted Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Act
analogs with respect to interstate commerce in prison-made goods. A challenge to the Hawes-Cooper Act,'70 which allowed state law to apply to original package sales of prison-made goods, contended that it was not a valid
exercise of the commerce power because "The goods, the movement of
which Congress seeks in this instance to regulate, are neither harmful, injurious nor deleterious." The Ohio law forbidding the sale of prison products
(in this case, men's work shirts) in the state imposed a burden on "an article

'rAmicus Brief at 30-31.
"'New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
"1045 Stat. 1084.
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of commerce which cannot be denominated an 'outlaw of commerce.'"''',

The Webb-Kenyon Act had been sustained only because of "the exceptional
nature of intoxicating liquors.' 72
These views had been anticipated in the congressional debate on the
bill.'73 Contending that the measure would delegate congressional power to
the states,'74 opponents denied that the liquor precedents were apposite.
"[N]o laws have been enacted by Congress prohibiting commodities in interstate commerce or making them subject to State laws unless there was something about the commodity itself which was deleterious either to the health
or to the morals of the people," insisted Representative Ramseyer of Iowa.
There was "nothing necessarily injurious in an article produced in a penitentiary." "Shirts made in a penitentiary are just like shirts made outside of
a penitentiary, and corn and hogs raised on a prison farm are just like corn
and hogs raised on any other farm."'75 Indeed, the bill's principal opponent
had invoked the authority of Knickerbocker Ice in a speech impugning the
constitutionality of the measure. "If the Congress of the United States can
not pass a law which will permit the maritime jurisdiction laws of the
Federal Government to be utilized by the States because it is a delegation of
governmental constitutional power to a State sovereignty," argued Senator
Goff of West Virginia, "then I say without the fear of successful contradiction that the Senate can not pass this bill, because in its essence it will be
purely and simply a delegation to the different States that see fit to take jurisdiction by prohibition of articles that come within their borders in the course
of interstate commerce."'76 Yet Goff's confidence proved to be misplaced.
Without dissent, Justice Sutherland brushed such reservations aside, meeting the petitioner's non-delegation argument with the authority of Rahrer.'77

"'Brief for the Petitioner, Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936), at 14.
id. at 37. See also id. at 43.
"'See 70 Cong. Rec. 816, 853-62, 866-67 (remarks of Sen. Goff); id. at 864 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
Senator Borah also objected that the bill "destroyed the very uniformity which it was the object and purpose of the interstate-commerce clause to accomplish." Senator Barkley pointed out that there was "no
provision of the Constitution that requires commerce to be uniform throughout the United States." When
Borah contradicted him, Barkley asked, "Where is it?" Borah responded, "I think it is just as implicit in
the commerce clause as if it were written there." Id. at 867.
"'See 69 Cong. Rec. 8650, 8749 (remarks of Mr. Busby); id. at 8655-56 (remarks of Mr. Tucker); id.
at 8665, 10772-72 (remarks of Mr. Sproul).
"169 Cong. Rec. at 8638-39. See also id. at 8652, 8663 (remarks of Mr. Montague).
I7670 Cong. Rec. at 861. See also id. at 866.
"'7297 U.S. at 437-41. Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Stone concurred in the result without
opinion. Sutherland had sought to distinguish Rahrer in the Webb-Kenyon Act debate, though it was not
clear from his remarks whether he approved or disapproved of the precedent. See 49 Cong. Rec. at 290910.
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Similar arguments were raised in opposition to the Ashurst-Sumners
Act,' 8 which made it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign
commerce goods made by convict labor into any State where the goods were
intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of its laws.
"Congress cannot prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of useful
and harmless articles of commerce made by convict labor," contended the
petitioner in Kentucky Whip & CollarCo. v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.'79 "The
opinion in the Clark Distilling Company case shows that the Webb-Kenyon
Act was sustained solely because of the nature of the article (intoxicating
liquor) therein dealt with.""'8 Once again such arguments were unavailing.
There was no dissent from Chief Justice Hughes' pronouncement that "[t]he
contention is inadmissible that the Act of Congress is invalid merely because
the horse collars and harness which petitioner manufactures and sells are
useful and harmless articles."' 8 Congress had not "attempted to delegate its
authority to the States." As it had in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,
Hughes maintained, "Congress has formulated its own policy and established its own rule. The fact that it has adopted its rule in order to aid the
enforcement of valid state laws affords no ground for constitutional objection."' 2 Hughes' opinion was joined by Van Devanter and McReynolds, who
had been in the Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice majorities, and by Sutherland
and Butler, who had joined their fellow horsemen in the Dawson majority.
The convict-made goods decisions made it clear that it was not booze that
was different. It was admiralty that was different.
But why was admiralty different? After struggling to distinguish the
liquor regulation cases in Knickerbocker Ice, McReynolds had ultimately
taken comfort in disanalogy. "Here," he reminded his readers, "we are concerned with a wholly different constitutional provision-one which, for the
purpose of securing harmony and uniformity prescribes a set of rules,
empowers congress to legislate to that end, and prohibits material interference by the States."'83 But certainly, as Justice Holmes pointed out in his
Knickerbocker Ice dissent, the text of the Constitution provided no warrant
for such a conclusion. "[T]he single objection that I have heard to the law is
that it makes different rules for different places, and I see nothing in the
Constitution to prevent that," Holmes observed. "The only matters with
regard to which uniformity is provided for in the instrument so far as I now

1749 Stat. 494.

179299 U.S. 334, 335 (1937). This contention is elaborated in Brief for the Petitioner at 12-37.
'8299 U.S. at 338. See also Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, 33-34; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 13.
'"Id.at 347-48. Justice Stone did not participate.
"'Id.at 352.
"13253 U.S. at 166.
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remember,"-he apparently thought it unnecessary to refresh his recollection-"are duties, imposts and excises, naturalization and bankruptcy, in
Article I, Section 8. As to the purpose of the clause concerning the judicial
power in these cases nothing is said in the instrument itself. To read into it a
requirement of uniformity more mechanical than is educed from the express
requirement of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment seems to me extravagant.""8 This view echoed what Justice White had observed for the majority
in Clark Distilling: "the argument seeks to engraft upon the Constitution a
restriction not found in it, that is, that the power to regulate conferred upon
Congress obtains subject to the requirement that regulations enacted shall be
uniform throughout the United States." 5 "Indeed," Holmes continued,
McReynolds' conclusion was "contrary to the construction of the
Constitution" implicit in the saving clause. "The saving of a common-law
remedy adopted the common law of the several States within their several
jurisdictions, and, I may add by way of anticipation, included at least some
subsequent statutory changes." Accordingly, Holmes concluded, "I cannot
doubt that in matters with which Congress is empowered to deal it may
make different arrangements for widely different localities with perhaps
86
widely different needs."'
McReynolds may have been referring not to textual differences between
Congress' relative powers over interstate commerce and maritime matters,
but instead to differences in the intent of the framers with respect to those
two powers. "Obviously," McReynolds wrote in Knickerbockerice, "if every
State may freely declare the rights and liabilities incident to maritime
employment, there will at once arise the confusion and uncertainty which
framers of the Constitution both foresaw and undertook to prevent."'87 He
would echo this theme again in Dawson: "the Constitution adopted the law

11'253 U.S. at 168. Justice Brandeis echoed these observations in his dissent in Dawson."In respect to
bankruptcy, duties, imposts, excises and naturalization," he observed, "the Constitution prescribes uniformity." Yet the Court had permitted Congress to authorize disuniform state legislation even with respect
to subjects on which the text required uniformity in national rules. Citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181 (1902), Brandeis noted that, "Still the provision in the bankruptcy law giving effect to the
divergent exemption laws of the several States was held valid." 264 U.S. at 235. As Pillsbury had argued
on brief, "The maxim, inclusio unius exclusio alterius, as well as sound logic, indicates that the
Constitution does not require uniformity of acts of Congress in respect to other powers granted." Amicus
Brief at 35.
t85242 U.S. at 327.
18253 U.S. at 168-69. These views were echoed in Morrison, supra note 45, at 479 ("The Constitution
says nothing about uniformity; in fact, there are no express provisions of any kind with respect to the substantive maritime law or the legislative power thereover"); and Is Absolute Uniformity In Admiralty Law
Established by the Constitution?, 91 Cent. L. J. 43 (1920)("in requiring that the admiralty law shall be
uniform throughout the country, the Court had added something to the Constitution that is not in that
instrument and to such extent has attempted to amend that instrument").
117253 U.S. at 166.

January 2001

Lochner,Liquor & Longshoremen

of the sea as the measure of maritime rights and obligations. The confusion
and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local statutes at
every port, are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the States may
prefer local rules; but the Union was formed with the very definite design of
freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such
control. The subject is national. Local interest must yield to the common
welfare. The Constitution is supreme." '
George Canfield asserted much the same thing in an article published in
1926.89 But like McReynolds' claim, Canfield's rested on contestable interpretation of a few sources. It did not even purport to controvert Justice
Pitney's report that "In a somewhat exhaustive examination of various
sources of information, including Elliot's Debates, Farrand's Records of the
Federal Convention, and The Federalist, Nos. 80-83, I have been unable to
find anything even remotely suggesting that the judicial clause was designed
to establish the maritime code or any other system of laws for the determination of controversies in the courts by its established, much less any suggestion that the maritime code was to constitute the rule of decision in common-law courts, either federal or state."' 90 As Austin Wright remarked in
1925, "remarkably little was said by [the framers] on the subject of admiralty and maritime law and jurisdiction. The grant thereof to the Federal tribunals appears in their first draft and remains unchanged to the end. There
was hardly any debate upon it .... When the framers went forth to justify
the Constitution to the states, again little was said .... The nature of admi9
ralty and maritime law seems nowhere to have been discussed."' '

188264 U. S. at 228.
89
Canfield, The Uniformity of the Maritime Law, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 544. 556-57 (1926) (Article III's
Admiralty Clause "was intended to create jurisdiction and that jurisdiction would necessarily imply a
particular system of law by which such cases should be judged. That system was to be binding on all the
courts, since it was to supplant to diversity of systems of which the Federalist speaks. It was to be binding upon the courts of the common law as well as upon the courts of admiralty .... All of the state courts
had been administering maritime law in different measures. It was intended that there should be a common and uniform scale. The purpose was to adopt the maritime law for all courts in which maritime causes should be litigated because in no other way could the desired uniformity be attained").
9244 U.S. at 228. Nor did it meet Holmes' point concerning the saving clause, echoed by Stanley
Morrison: "The nearest thing we have to a contemporaneous interpretation-the saving clause of the
original Judiciary Act-makes clear that complete uniformity is not required. For whatever may have
been intended with regard to the substantive law, the saving clause makes uniformity of remedy impossible." Morrison, supra note 45, at 479. See also Palfrey, supra note 75, at 784 ("if the Constitution of the
United States enacted for all courts a complete system of maritime law, it is not obvious how an act of
Congress saving a common law remedy could have any effect upon the substantive maritime law").
Compare Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States (1), 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 123, 129
(1925) (the saving clause "is at most some evidence of the framers' attitude toward the concurrency of
state jurisdiction").
9
'Wright, supra note 190, at 128.
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Wright did report, however, that "we do find Madison and Randolph in
' 92
Virginia relating the grant of jurisdiction to the desirability of uniformity."'
Madison had said that "If, in any case, uniformity is necessary, it must be in
the exposition of treaties. The establishment of one revisionary superintending power can alone secure such uniformity. To the same principle may also
' 93
be referred their cognizance in admiralty and maritime cases." 1
Recall from Charles Rahrer's brief, however, Justice Johnson's observation in Gibbons v. Ogden: that, under the Articles of Confederation, "the resolution of Virginia, appointing her commissioners, to meet commissioners
from other States, expresses their purpose to be, 'to take into consideration
the trade of the United States, to consider how far a uniform system in the
commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interests and
their permanent harmony.' And Mr. Madison's resolution, which led to that
measure, is introduced by a preamble entirely explicit to this point:
'Whereas, the relative situation of the United States has been found, on trial,
to require uniformity in their commercial regulations, as the only effectual
policy for obtaining, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such nations in the ports
of the United States, for preventing animosities, which cannot fail to arise
among the several States, from the interference of partial and separate regulations,' &c. 'therefore, resolved,' &c."' 94 Just as one might be able to build
a requirement of uniformity in maritime law on the remarks of Madison, so
one also might build a similar requirement of uniformity in exercises of the
commerce power. What McReynolds and defenders of the Court's admiralty decisions did not construct, however, was a defense of the asymmetric
imposition of the uniformity constraint.
One possible justification for the asymmetry, was offered not by
McReynolds but by subsequent apologists for this turn in the Court's admiralty jurisprudence. Madison's remarks suggest that the need for uniformity
in admiralty arises principally from its frequent role in international relations. Austin Wright sounded this theme in defense of the uniformity
requirement. As Wright reminded his readers, Hamilton had written in

9Id. at 128-29. Canfield had relied almost entirely on Randolph's remarks at the Virginia ratifying
convention: "Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with propriety, be vested in particular
state courts, as our national tranquility and reputation, and intercourse with foreign powers, may be
affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought, therefore, to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen distinct, independent jurisdictions,-this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal
judiciary." 3 Elliott's Debates 571, quoted at Canfield, supra note 189, at 555.
1933Elliott's Debates, ed. 1845, 532, quoted at Wright, supra note 190, at 129, n. 15. Professor Ernest

Young maintains that this concern extended principally to prize, criminal and revenue cases, and not to
private civil litigation. See Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 314-28 (1999).

'Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 225.
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Federalist 80: "The most bigoted idolizers of State Authority have not thus
far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners," that they "ought not to be left at the
disposal of a PART."' 95 Hamilton's "tacit premise," Wright maintained, was
that uniformity in maritime law was requisite to agreeable relations with foreign nations,' 96 and "such a reason, so far as foreigners are concerned, clearly justifies the recent decisions of the Supreme Court."'97 At the very least,
"there is nothing to show that the framers intended that in the exercise of
[concurrent maritime] jurisdiction the state courts might apply whatever law
they pleased, at least in the case of the foreign litigant, who was a defendant
98
in state court."'
This justification, however, failed to meet two objections raised by
Stanley Morrison. First, it did not explain why uniformity was required in
cases not involving international relations. As Morrison put it: "One may
well wonder what practical end is gained by this requirement of geographical uniformity in the rights of injured stevedores, especially when in the
service of a local independent contractor. Where both employer and employee are local residents, whose interests are local, and the service is performed
wholly in a single port, little good is accomplished by the identity of the
workman's rights to compensation in New York and San Francisco. It means
nothing either to employer or to employee, and the shipowner has no direct
concern with the matter. Justification may be found only in the realm of pure
theory, uncontaminated by reality."'99 Second, divorced from a persuasive
textual or originalist argument, Wright's pragmatic explanation could not
justify the allocation of institutional authority implicit in Knickerbocker Ice.
For as Morrison pointed out, "it is hard to say that the national and international interests concerned cannot safely be intrusted to Congress ....It is a
job for the legislative body, with its capacity for investigation and its closer
contact with the world's activities.' 2°

" Wright, supra note 190, at 131-32. Bradford Clark points out that Hamilton may have been referring only to prize cases with this remark. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1337 (1996).
"Wright, supra note 190, at 133.
'"'Id. at 132. See also Note, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1920) ("as a matter of international relations
...there is every reason for preserving a high degree of uniformity in the maritime law").
'Wright, supra note 190, at 134.
'"Morrison, supra note 45, at 482. See, to the same effect, Chamberlain, Legislation Now Needed to
Restore Compensation to Longshoremen, 10 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 241,242 (1920) (arguing that a uniform
rule is necessary for sailors but not for longshoremen).
"°Morrisonsupra note 45, at 480-81.
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VI

THE PASSION FOR UNIFORMITY
While McReynolds' opinions leave us with no satisfactory explanation for
why admiralty is different, the postures of some of the Justices are more
readily explicable than those of others. In joining Dawson, Taft and
Sutherland were merely embracing constitutional views they had expressed
with respect to delegation and uniformity in the debate over the WebbKenyon Act. The votes of McReynolds and Van Devanter in the Commerce
Clause cases suggest the possibility of similar motivations in their cases.
McReynolds concurred only in the result in Clark Distilling, and Van
Devanter had dissented without opinion. Both would concur only in the
result in Whitfield v. Ohio. This suggests the possibility that they voted as
they did in these cases only because they felt bound, first by the authority of
Rahrer (in the case of McReynolds), and then by that of Clark Distilling.
That is, they may have believed with Taft and Sutherland that the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts violated nondelegation and uniformity norms that properly governed exercises of the commerce power. :°' If so, these four (and perhaps Sanford and Butler, who would join them in Dawson) were merely
adopting a rule in admiralty that they believed properly governed Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as well, but for which they had been unable to secure
a majority. Faced with a choice between reorienting federalism jurisprudence around the Clark Distilling heresy and isolating the booze cases as
exceptions to a general rule, they chose the latter."2 Having lost and conceded defeat in the battle on land, they sought to salvage a small victory at
sea.
The announcement of uniformity as a constitutional imperative coincided
with rising sentiment for uniformity as a matter of policy. As the writings of
Madison illustrate, the desire for uniformity in commercial regulation was
an animating force behind the meetings of the Annapolis and Philadelphia
conventions in the 1780s.2 °' The attraction of a general federal common law
was in large measure attributable to its potential to bring uniformity, particularly to the law governing commercial transactions. 2" As Ed Purcell has
2

'Thomas Reed Powell suggested the possibility of such a motivation for Van Devanter's dissent
without opinion in Clark Distilling. See Powell, supra note 142, at 136, n. 33.
2
'As one observer put it, "The validity of some of these federal adoptive acts relating to commerce
remains somewhat doubtful in view of the general principles which the Court has endorsed in cases
involving adoptive statutes in other fields." Kallenbach, supra note 104, at 346-47. Kallenbach went on
to observe that the admiralty decisions "represent the orthodox view on the matter of federal authority to
confer power upon the states," a view that the liquor cases had "subjected to a severe strain." Id. at 372.
2
'See N. MacChesney, Uniform Laws: A Needed Protection to and Stimulus of Interstate Investment
3(1911).
2
1 See T. Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in American Federalism 46-47
(1981).
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observed, "One of the fundamental justifications of the federal common law
was that it would allow the development of a uniform national law and
thereby facilitate rational economic planning." Yet "[b]y the late nineteenth
century, if not before, it seemed clear that Swift [v. Tyson 2 5] was not achieving that goal." Swift "failed to bring complete uniformity" to the commercial
law, and it "failed to bring any uniformity in many other areas of general
206
law."
It was during this period that the elite bar began to look for alternative
solutions to the problem of legal heterogeneity. The formation of the
American Bar Association in 1878 was motivated in part by an interest in
bringing greater uniformity to the laws of the several states. Members of the
state and national bar associations continued to sound this theme at annual
meetings, and, in 1889, the ABA appointed a Special Committee on
Uniform State Laws. Out of this grew the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which held its first meeting in 1892.
Over the course of the next quarter century, the Commissioners adopted
twenty-one uniform acts, most of which pertained -to commercial transactions, wills, deeds and domestic relations. 7 By 1911, an editorial in the
Green Bag would declare, "The movement for uniformity of state laws has
gathered such headway that the desire of the readers of the Green Bag to
help it in every possible way may be taken for granted, and it is hardly necessary to present any arguments to show why it should receive the support
of the bar. The evils of diversity in state laws are obvious," and "All that legal
conservatism which resists the progress of this movement is foredoomed to
defeat. 208
As these remarks suggest, the movement for uniform state laws was driven by frankly instrumental impulses. ABA members were agreed that "variant and conflicting laws produce in all the states the special evils or inconveniences of perplexity, uncertainty, and confusion, with consequent waste,
a tendency to hinder freedom of trade and to occasion unnecessary insecurity of contracts, resulting in needless litigation and miscarriage of justice,"
20541U.S.
2

(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
"E. Purcell, Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 18701958 (1992), at 63.
2
"'W. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society, 1890-1930 240-48
(1986); W. Armstrong, A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 11-22 (1991); Purcell, supra note 206, at 356, n. 77; Constitution
and By-Laws of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1915); L. Brewster,
Uniform State Laws 1 (1898); C. Terry, Uniform State Laws Ann. (1920); MacChesney, supra note 203,
at 5; J. Colby, Uniformity of State Laws 24-26 (1892); Smith, "Outlook for Uniformity of Legislation,"
23 Green Bag 619 (1911); Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 Yale L. J. 132, 132-33
(1897).
"'Editorial, The Uniformity of State Laws, 23 Green Bag 653 (1911).
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and that "greater uniformity is desirable and most urgently and immediately needed in matters affecting directly the business common to and coextensive with the whole country."20 9 As one leader of the movement put it, "[t]he
constantly increasing inter-state trade and traffic, inter-state migration, and
the wonderful development of the means of intercommunication fuse, and
unite all interests and localities. Variance, dissonance, contradiction, nay,
any unnecessary diversity in the fifty subdivisions of the one American people, in the general laws affecting the whole people in their business and
social relations, cannot but produce perplexity, uncertainty, and damage.
Such diversity, always an annoyance, is often a nuisance." Having fifty different systems of law for the regulation of commercial transactions was as
"harmful and injudicious ... as it would be for us to have fifty different languages, or fifty different metric systems." Our increasingly vibrant interstate
trade was "entitled to the protection and advantage of substantially uniform
laws." 2 ' As Lawrence Friedman has observed, "The United States was, or
had become, a gigantic free-trade area; businessmen needed fair, uniform
laws of commerce to take advantage of this huge, rich domestic market."2 '
This instrumental defense of uniformity was echoed in McReynolds'
Jensen opinion. If New York could "subject foreign ships coming into her
ports to such obligations as those imposed by her Compensation Statute,
other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the
Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between
the States and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and
impeded."2 '2 "The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to
comply with the local statutes at every port," he remarked in Dawson, "are
' As he wrote in Knickerbocker Ice, the Constitution
not difficult to see."213
"°Armstrong, supra note 207, at 20. These sentiments were echoed widely. See W. Snyder, The
Problem of Uniform Legislation in the United States 3 (1892); J. Beale, The Diversity of Laws 17 (1916);
Moore, The Passion for Uniformity, 62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 525,539-40 (1914); Brewster, Uniform State Laws,
supra note 207, 1-2, 4, 18-19; MacChesney, supra note 203, at 3-4; Colby, supra note 207, at 23; Wheeler,
The Necessity for Uniform Laws Governing Commercial Paper in the United States, 13 Banking L. J.
694 (1896); Taylor, The Unification of American Law, 22 Green Bag 267 (1910); Brewster, Promotion,
supra note 207, at 139-40; Lapp, Uniform State Legislation, 4 Am.Pol. Sci, Rev. 576, 576-77 (1910);
Jones, Uniformity of Laws, 11 Banking L. J. 137 (1894); Progress of the Movement for Uniform State
Laws, 14 Law Notes 101 (1910); Scott, Uniformity of State Laws, 8 The Am. Mag. of Civics 303 (1896);
Dembitz, Uniformity of State Laws, 168 N. Am. Rev. 84 (1899); Walsh, Uniform Laws and Court
Procedure, 3 Law. and Bank. and Bench & Bar Rev. 165 (1910).
2
Colby, supra note 207, at 29, quoting Lyman Brewster.
2
'L. Friedman, A History of American Law 408 (2d ed. 1985). See MacChesney, supra note 203 at
26.
212244

U.S. at 217.
213264 U.S. at 228. A prominent spokesman for the uniform laws movement had issued a call for the

enactment of a national code of maritime law as early as 1894. See Jones, Uniformity of Laws through
National and Interstate Codification, 28 Am. L. Rev. 547, 566 (1894).
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aimed "to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation."' 24 And while industrial accident
law had not been an initial priority of the uniform laws movement, it would
soon become one. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, which abolished
the fellow-servant rule and the assumption of risk defense and replaced contributory negligence with a comparative negligence regime, was a conscious
attempt to bring uniformity to the law governing railway workplace accidents. As the House report noted, "by this bill it is hoped to fix a uniform
rule of liability throughout the Union with reference to the liability of common carriers to their employees .... A Federal statute of this character will
supplant numerous State statutes on the subject so far as they relate to interstate commerce. It will create uniformity throughout the Union, and the legal
status of such employer's liability for personal injuries instead of being subject to numerous rules will be fixed by one rule in all the States 21' Yet all
other workplace accident cases that might be litigated in state or federal
court remained subject to the very patchwork of common law and state
statute that FELA aimed to replace with a single uniform rule.
In 1908, the National Civic Federation turned its attention to the new and
controversial subject of workmen's compensation. As concern over the lack
of uniformity among the various state laws grew over the next few years,"1 6
the Federation set up a variety of committees to study the issue and to develop model legislation that might be introduced in all of the states. Working in
cooperation with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
211253 U.S. at 164.
2

1H. Rept. 1386 (60-1), at 1, 3.
Robbins, Uniformity in Workmen's Compensation Laws, 81 Cent. L. J. 228, 228-29 (1915)
("Probably no subject of law shows such wide variation in the different states as do the various
Workmen's Compensation Laws. This great lack of uniformity has opened the eyes of businessmen to
the great need of a uniform law on this subject." There were "rapidly developing problems resulting from
the lack of uniformity in the more than thirty state workmen's compensation laws .... An enormous
amount of office clerical work is already involved, particularly in covering an employer, for example,
whose operations extend over several states or all of the states in which compensation laws are in force
•.. not only is lack of uniformity a great burden on the insurance companies, but ... it more directly
affects the public in increasing the cost to the purchaser of workmen's compensation insurance, and also
complicates the process of settlement of claims, because of which friction and uncertainty the public may
suffer frequent losses in the course of such settlements"); Lack of Uniformity in Workmen's
Compensation Laws, 24 Case & Com. 230 (1916) ("the laws of the various states reveal curious and glaring inconsistencies"); Correspondence, Suggestion for Uniform Compensation Legislation, 81 Cent. L.
J. 282 (1915) (noting the need for "a uniform system for all the states"); Shall There Be a Uniform Act
on the Subject of Workman's Compensation, 75 Cent. L. J. 10 (1912) ("there is no doubt that it would be
of great advantage for some competent body or commission to consider carefully all the proposed laws
and to draw up a draft for adoption by the states. Such an act should be uniform throughout the country"); Incurable Diversities in State Laws, 14 Law Notes 205 (1911) ("At the annual meeting of the
National Civic Federation last month Andrew Carnegie said there was great need of uniform legislation
in the matter of compensation for industrial accidents"); Parker, Uniform State Laws, 19 Yale L. J. 401,
407-08 (1910) (citing the need for uniform workmen's compensation legislation).
216See
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State Laws, by 1914 they had produced a Uniform Workmen's
Compensation Act.2 7 The Chairman of the National Civic Federation's
Committee on Uniform Legislation Upon Workmen's Compensation was
none other than Senator George Sutherland. As James Weinstein reports,
Sutherland "was instrumental in helping draw up legislation for both the
' 28
states and for the federal government.
Sutherland's role at the federal level grew out of his 1911 appointment by
President Taft to chair the joint Congressional Commission on Workmen's
Compensation. The Commission held hearings throughout the year and in
February of 1912 produced its final report. The Commission's report proposed enactment of a federal statute creating a system of workmen's compensation for employees of interstate carriers. 29 The report enjoyed the support of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of Railway
Conductors, the Brotherhood of Railways Trainmen, and the National Civic
Federation. 2' Henry Rogers Seager, President of the American Association
for Labor Legislation, saluted the bill proposed by Sutherland's
Commission, seeing "good reason to hope that from it will emerge a federal compensation law that may serve as a useful model for state legislation
and give an impetus to the movement toward uniformity, which has thus far
2'2
been sadly lacking except in academic discussions of the problem.' '
Sutherland's bill also enjoyed the vigorous endorsement of President Taft,
an enthusiastic supporter of the NCF's campaign for uniform state laws in a
variety of areas, including workmen's compensation (in 1909 he told a
group of White House visitors including Samuel Gompers that, next to his
own work, uniform legislation was "the most important proposition now
before the public").22 In addition to vouching for the bill's constitutionality,
Taft's message urging enactment of Sutherland's bill remarked, "One of the
great objections to the old common-law method of settling questions of this
character was the lack of uniformity in the recoveries made by injured
employees and by the representatives of those who suffered death ....Now,

'IM. Green, The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925 (1973),
at 245-55; C. Terry, Uniform State Laws Annotated 447-83 (1920).
"'Weinstein, supra note 36, at 59.
2
'Paschal, supra note 37, 65-69; Weinstein, supra note 36, at 59; Green, supra note 217, at 250-53,
347.
22
Weinstein, supra note 36, at 59.
21ISeager, Introductory Address, 2 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 9, 13, 14 (1912).
2
1 d. at 31-32. Taft's assessment paled next to that of the report of the first meeting of the National
Conference, which characterized its enterprise as "the most important juristic work undertaken in the
United States since the adoption of the Federal Constitution." Armstrong, supra note 207, at 11.
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under this system the tendency will be to create as nearly a uniform system
223
as can be devised.
In joining the Dawson majority, then, Taft and Sutherland (and perhaps
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sanford and Butler) were not simply succumbing to the authority of Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice. They were also giving
voice to a general theory under which exercises of federal power were subject to the constitutional requirements that they operate uniformly and not
delegate power to the states. Not surprisingly, this constitutional theory
enjoyed harmonious relations with the political commitment to uniformity
they had demonstrated in work with the NCF and the National Conference,
and in elective office.
VII
SPECULATIONS: TWO FORMS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
As I have suggested in the previous section, what was true of Taft and
Sutherland in Dawson may well have been true of Van Devanter and
McReynolds in Knickerbocker Ice. But some questions remain. First, the
voting behavior of three of their colleagues is not as easily explained. For
McKenna and Day silently joined both White's Clark Distilling opinion and
McReynolds' Jensen, Knickerbocker Ice and (in McKenna's case) Dawson
opinions. Moreover White, whose prose style has posed considerable challenges to those who would seek to understand his jurisprudence, wrote the
language in Clark Distilling that seemed to many of his contemporaries
impossible to reconcile with the Knickerbocker Ice opinion he joined.
Nor do we yet have an adequate explanation of why the Jensen majority
chose to insist on greater uniformity in the admiralty context than the Court
had in the past required in the dormant Commerce Clause context. A normative preference for uniformity may be part of the explanation, but here the
uniformity requirement imposed in admiralty was completely alien to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Workplace injuries occurring in

22348 Cong. Rec. 2228 (1912). The House report recommending passage of the bill echoed this theme:
"Your committee is also of the opinion that, not only as a matter of wholesome and proper legislation,
but as a matter of uniformity and convenience, when Congress takes jurisdiction of the subject matter of
regulating the relations between employer and employee engaged in interstate commerce by railroads in
all matters relating to the accidental death and injury of the employee engaged in such commerce that
such jurisdiction should be complete and exclusive." H. Rept. 1441 (62-3), at 2.
22
Day's return of Holmes' draft dissent in Jensen provides a partial explanation. He wrote, "As an old
sailor I stand for a uniform rule of liability on the high seas-hence I cannot agree with your view."
Holmes Papers, quoted in A. Bickel & B. Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 19101921, at 562, n. 49. I have discovered no similar record of how Day's nautical background might have
informed his views on temperance reform.
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interstate commerce had long been governed by state common law when litigated in state court, and by any relevant state statutes when tried by a federal court sitting in diversity. It was only the enactment of FELA in 1908 that
had supplanted this regime.
And perhaps therein lies the answer to our conundrum. It may be that the
timing of Jensen helps more than the text, the original understanding, or
international ramifications in explaining its outcome. For Jensen was decided after FELA had been enacted. It was no longer politically improbable that
Congress would step in and enact a uniform, progressive reform of the law
governing workplace accidents occurring in the federal jurisdiction. One can
easily understand why, when Sherlock v. Alling was decided in 1876, a dormant Commerce Clause rule permitting the application of state accident law
statutes to injuries sustained in interstate commerce was so appealing. As
Bernard Gavit observed, "If there be no Federal Common Law covering
such situations, and Congress has not acted, a contrary holding would oper' The first major
ate to give the Commerce Clause a very destructive effect."225
federal statute regulating interstate transport, the Interstate Commerce Act,
was still eleven years away; it would be thirty years before Congress would
enact the first Employers' Liability Act. At a time of such congressional lassitude, such a contrary holding would have been "destructive" of any statutory modification or amelioration of the common law of torts. But by 1917,
it was clear to the Court that interstate accident law had captured the attention of the national legislature. In 1911, Van Devanter had written the unanimous opinion (in which White, Day and McKenna had each joined) upholding FELA against constitutional attack;22 ' he would later do the same when
the Jones Act of 1920227 was sustained by a unanimous Court in 1924.2' That
latter year McReynolds would practically request that Congress enact a uniform national workmen's compensation statute for maritime employees in
his Dawson opinion. 29 And as we have seen, the Court similarly sustained

the LHWCA without dissent. 3 The Justices were obviously receptive to
uniform, progressive, national tort reform; and the Jensen majority may well
have expected that the congressional response to the decision would be modeled not on the Webb-Kenyon Act, but instead on the sort of workmen's
compensation bill for employees of interstate carriers that Sutherland had
sponsored so recently in the Senate.
"'B. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 288 (1932).
221Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
22741Stat. 1007 (1920). That same year Congress enacted the Death on the High Seas Act, creating a
maritime cause of action for wrongful death. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), codified at 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 762-68.
'mPanama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
-264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924).
"Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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The recent history of congressional reform legislation would have lent
support to such an inference. For liquor regulation was not the only domain
in which the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence had threatened to compromise the efficacy of state reform legislation. And in those
areas in which the states were in substantial agreement on the policy question, Congress had sought to assist them not with a Wilson Act analog, but
instead through federal prohibition of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce to carry on the disfavored activity.
Consider the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. As a principal supporter of
the measure observed, "nearly every State in the Union already has a purefood law or a code pertaining to the introduction of pure food."23' Yet "in the
construction of the interstate-commerce law," explained Senator McCumber,
"it has been declared that the term 'commerce' not only covers an article in
its transit from one State to another, but it protects and shields that article
until it is sold in original packages in the State of its consumption ... the
root of the evil is planted in that territory over which the State has no control and over which Congress has complete control-that is, the jurisdiction
over interstate commerce." '32 State officials could not "prevent the shipment
into the State of an adulterated article unless it was absolutely and unquestionably of so poisonous or unfit a character that it could not be considered
as a commercial product. Under the construction of the interstate-commerce
clause of the Constitution goods other that those which I have mentioned
may be shipped into a State contrary to the laws of the State and may be sold
in the original unbroken packages in that State. '233 Accordingly, "Congress
alone can make effective the laws of the several States prohibiting the manufacture or sale of this class of articles. The States are helpless under the law.
Under the Constitution, as it has been construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, these goods may go from one State to another in unbroken
packages, and it is not until the package is broken that the jurisdiction of the
State attaches. The State laws are helpless. There is a cry from every State
of the Union-I think I may say that I have within my possession a demand
from nearly every State of the Union-that the Congress of the United States
23

'Remarks of Sen. McCumber, 40 Cong. Rec. 1216; see also id. at 1415 ("nearly every State in the
Union has passed pure-food laws"); id. at 2655 ("There is scarcely a State in the Union that has not got
a positive law against the use of any one of the preservatives that are mentioned here"); id. at 2761 ("All
of the States have their pure food laws"); remarks of Sen. Heyburn, 40 Cong. Rec. 895 ("Nearly every
State in the Union, Mr. President, has a pure-food law. The States have undertaken to legislate upon this
subject, with, I believe, but one or two exceptions. Some of the laws upon the subject are very meager;
some of them are very local; some of them are adpated to the peculiar local interests of the people of the
particular State, but, as a rule, the States have enacted intelligent and appropriate legislation upon this
question"); id. at2656 ("nearly all the States have pure-food laws").
23
Remarks of Sen. McCumber, 40 Cong. Rec. 1416.
233
1d. at 1217.
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should supplement their legislation and afford relief against the impositions
that come from one State to another."' 234 That demand had been met by uniform federal legislation prohibiting the interstate shipment of impure, adulterated or mislabeled food and drugs.23
Now consider the Mann Act of 1910. "By 1900," reports Thomas Mackey,
"all of the American states had written laws making keeping a bawdy house,
renting a house for prostitution, and being a prostitute statutory offenses. 236
Yet the states faced constitutional restraints on their ability to cope with the
burgeoning interstate "White Slave Trade." As the report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee recommending passage of the Act explained, "It is no
longer open to question that the transit of individuals form State to State is
interstate commerce." "Manifestly a State could not enact that a person who
induced a woman to go from one State to another for purposes of prostitution should not aid or assist in her transportation from one State to another,
or that the common carrier should not transport the prostitute. To do so
would be a plain attempt to regulate interstate commerce. (Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100)." Transportation of persons was a subject "national in its character" and therefore requiring uniform regulation. "The subject matter of the
legislation being, therefore, one over which the States have no control, it
must be... within the domain of proper federal legislation. 237 President Taft
1 ld. See also id. at 1216 ("The food commissioners of the several States have been busily engaged
in attempting to eradicate the evil of impure food, but they are met, Mr. President, at every point by the
rules of interstate commerce and are brought face to face with a condition over which the State itself has
no control"); remarks of Sen. Heyburn, id. at 895 ("the State into which they are sent is helpless against
the flood of these impure articles sent in unbroken packages under that rule of law"); remarks of Sen.
Money, id. at 2656, 2657 ("The State can not touch the article in the original package"; Regier, The
Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, I Law & Contemp. Probs. 3, 5 (1933) ("By 1906 practically all the states had pure food laws ....It was soon apparent that only a national law would be adequate. The states, acting separately, could not protect themselves against interstate commerce"). Whether
the principle of Leisy in fact extended to the articles regulated by the bill was a matter of debate in the
House, see remarks of Mr. Bartlett, 40 Cong. Rec. 9049-51, and the Senate, see remarks of Sen. Bailey,
id. at 2758-67; but the bill ultimately passed the House by a vote of 241-17, 40 Cong. Rec. 9075-76, and
the Senate by a similarly lopsided voted of 63-4, id. at 2773.
2'134 Stat. 768, unanimously upheld in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (191 I).
236,.
Mackey, Red Lights Out 123 (Garland, 1984). See also remarks of Mr. Bartlett, 45 Cong. Rec.
App. 11 (1910).
"S. Rept. 886 (61-2), 7-9; H. Rept. 47 (61-2), 3-5. See also remarks of Mr. Saunders, 45 Cong. Rec.
1040 (describing the white slave trade as "a traffic that is widespread, infamous, and degraded, one which
the States are unable to deal with in all its phases, in the exercise of the police power. But that feature of
the business which the States are powerless to reach, is not beyond our powers"); remarks of Mr. Russell,
45 Cong. Rec. 816-19 (arguing that the transportation of persons across state lines is interstate commerce
over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction: "Is there a State that could enact legislation like this? To
ask the question is to get the negative answer. Then the only jurisdiction that can enact it is this jurisdiction here, the Congress of the United States, and it is clearly within the power granted by the Constitution
to regulate commerce among the States"); remarks of Mr. Peters, 45 Cong. Rec. 1035-37 ("the transit of
individuals from State to State is in itself commerce ... a form of commerce which comes under the class
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had sent a message to Congress stating, "I believe it to be constitutional to
forbid, under penalty, the transportation of persons for purposes of prostitution across state and national lines, '238 and the Congress had acted accordingly. Here again, the remedy for the dormant Commerce Clause disability
under which the states labored in their efforts to combat prostitution was
uniform, national legislation prohibiting the interstate transportation of a
woman for an immoral purpose.239

In these instances in which there was virtual policy consensus among the
states, then, Congress had not resorted to the sort of divesting formula
employed in the liquor context.2 4 Instead, Congress had solved the dormant
Commerce Clause problem, while avoiding the sticky delegation issues
raised in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Act debates, simply by enacting a
uniform law governing the disfavored transactions occurring within the federal jurisdiction.24 ' The Congress had developed two forms of cooperative
federalism under the Commerce Clause, each responsive to a different configuration of policy preference.
Bearing this in mind, let us return now to the subject of workmen's compensation. Before 1909, no American state had enacted such a statute. Yet
the rapidity with which such measures transformed the landscape of work-

of cases in which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction .... It would be obviously unconstitutional for any
State to attempt to enact a law or affect such commerce or make the purchase of a ticket in one State to
be used in interstate transportation constitute a crime. To Congress, therefore, must we look for aid");
Rogers, The Power of the States Over Commodities Excluded by Congress From Interstate Commerce,
24 Yale L. J. 567, 569 ("the state has no power, in the absence of congressional legislation, to prevent the
importation of women for immoral purposes ... for this reason, federal action was necessary .... It is
extremely doubtful whether before the Mann Act the states could have kept out women who intended to
engage in immoral practices").
2345 Cong. Rec. App. 15 (1910).
2'36 Stat. 825, unanimously upheld in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 309 (1913).
"A substitute pure food and drug bill modeled on the Wilson Act had been rejected in the House by
a vote of 188-44. See 40 Cong. Rec. 9061, 9075.
2
"'Congress had similarly enacted a statute prohibiting interstate shipment of lottery tickets in 1895,
28 Stat. 963, by which time lotteries had been outlawed in every state of the Union save Delaware, which
followed suit in 1897. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776-1976
(Washington D.C., 1977) at 87, 272-73, 311-14, 337, 396-98; J. Ezell, Fortune's Merry Wheel, 241-70
(1960); remarks of Senator Hoar, 26 Cong. Rec. 4314 (1894); remarks of Mr. Gorman, 26 Cong. Rec.
4313 (1894); remarks of Mr. Broderick, 27 Cong. Rec. 3013 (1895). Indeed, Congress had, only the year
before Jensen was decided, enacted a similar statute concerning the products of child labor-a matter on
which there was far less policy consensus among the states. 39 Stat. 675. Lindsay Rogers maintained that
such statutes effectively divested the articles in question of their character as interstate commerce, so that
state police regulations could apply: "When Congress has excluded certain commodities from interstate
commerce the protection of interstate commerce is taken away from these commodities and the authority of the state can attach to them while they are in transit to the extent of forbidding them entrance to the
state"). Rogers, supra note 237, at 570-71.
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place accident law was nothing short of breathtaking. 2 2 By 1915 the momentum was so great that one observer could confidently predict that "this radical departure from the common law ... probably will be" "made in all the
States of the Union. 2 43 "It is a question of only a short time," wrote another,
"before all states will have in force statutes of this character." 2" By 1917,
when Jensen was decided, thirty-seven of the forty-eight states already had
them.245 By 1920, when the Court decided Knickerbocker Ice, the number
2
had swelled to forty-two. 46
As had been the case with pure food and drugs,
prostitution, and lotteries, there was a quickly emerging policy consensus
among the states in favor of workmen's compensation. And here the congressional response had tracked earlier federal initiatives in those areas. 247
Versions of Sutherland's workmen's compensation bill for employees of
interstate carriers had passed the Senate in 1912 by a vote of 64 to 15,248 and
the House the following year by a vote of 218 to 8 1.249Similar bills had been
introduced in the second session of the sixty-third Congress 250 and the first
session of the sixty-fourth. 5' Supporters continued to see cause for optimism. As Daniel O'Donoghue wrote in 1915, "Without doubt, the same Bill
will again be introduced, and should and probably will be, passed at the next
' The
session of Congress."252
momentum at the federal level continued to
build when Congress enacted a bill setting up a system of workmen's compensation for employees of the United States in 1916.253 By contrast, the
prospects for uniformity of state workmen's compensation laws were fading.
By the end of 1916, only one state legislature had enacted the Uniform

2

14See O'Donoghue, Federal Accident Compensation Law, 3 Geo. L. J. 17 (1915) (ascribing the movement for workmen's compensation to "the widespread belief in the minds of the Bench and Bar, Capital
and Labor, and the public generally, that the common law, and the doctrines engrafted thereon ...are not
consistent with modem industrial conditions"); Purcell, supra note 206, at 163; Weinstein, supra note 36,
ch. 2; R. Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security, 1900-1935 (1968), ch. 3.
2 3
' 'Donoghue, supra note 242, at 17.
2
"Robbins, supra note 216, at 228.
21524 Case & Com. 230-31 (1917).
'10 Am. Lab. Legis. Rev. 7 (1920).
.. Weinstein, supra note 36, at 59.
'48 Cong. Rec. 5959.
"'49 Cong. Rec. 4547.
"See H.R. 11243, H.R. 15700, H.R. 19310 (63-2). None of these was reported out of committee.
"'See S. 4673, S. 5269, S. 14080, S. 14973 (64-1). Again, none of these was reported out of committee.
"0'Donoghue, supra note 242, at 23.
"M39 Stat. 742 (1916). President Taft had similarly established a workmen's compensation system for
employees in the Canal Zone under a provision of the Panama Canal Zone Act, 37 Stat. 560 (1912).
Paschal, supra note 37, at 69.

January 2001

Lochner,Liquor & Longshoremen

Workmen's Compensation Act. 24 "It has been impossible to guide these
many state measures into any semblance of uniformity," lamented one
25
observer. "[T]he task of securing uniformity seems almost a hopeless one.1
On the eve of the Jensen decision, it appeared that the only hope for a uniform scheme of compensation for maritime workplace accidents lay in congressional action. And the Justices had good reason to anticipate that the
congressional response to Jensen would take the form of a uniform, national workmen's compensation statute for maritime employees. 56
This may in turn help to explain the divergent votes of White, McKenna,
and Day. In 1890, when Leisy and the Wilson Act set liquor regulation and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence on its course, there were only seven dry
states.257 As late as 1915, the Hobson Amendment, a precursor to what would
become the Eighteenth Amendment, had failed even to win the necessary support of Congress. 58 Moreover, the Reed "Bone-Dry" Amendment, which
banned interstate transportation of liquor into all prohibition territory, was not
offered in the Senate until February of 191 7259-- a month after White delivered
the opinion of the Court in ClarkDistilling.As Richard Hamm reports, Reed's
25
The state was Pennsylvania. MacChesney, supra note 203, at 65. In 1917, W.O. Hart wrote that the
Uniform Workmen's Compensation Act was among those efforts of the National Conference "probably
never to be adopted as uniform laws." Hart, The Movement for Uniform State Laws, 8 Case & Com. 646,
652 (1917). As the Bureau of Labor Statistics observed in 1920, the "rapid growth of compensation legislation ... has operated to prevent the adoption of any one form of law as a type, so that although a single fundamental principle underlies the entire group of laws of this class, its expression and application
present great diversity of details in the different states. This is true not only of the primary factors of the
laws, such as the scope and the compensation benefits, but also of the system of compensation insurance,
administration, methods of election or rejection, etc." U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Comparison of Workmen's Compensation Laws of the United States and Canada up to January
1, 1920 (1920), p. 7. As Allison Dunham later observed in remarking on "the lack of success" of the
Uniform Workmen's Compensation Act, "when a problem arises in critical form, numerous states adopt
legislation to solve it, and thereafter it is too difficult politically to induce these states to change to a uniform law .... Once the public has arrived at the 'there ought to be a law' stage in its thinking about a
problem, the Conference procedure may make it too late for the Conference to draft a uniform law."
Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 Law &
Contemp.
Probs. 233, 244-46 (1965).
255
Robbins, supra note 214, at 228-29 ("it seems now practically an impossibility to guide the remaining states ... to the enactment of measures which will be any more uniform with those of each other or
that of any state now in force than those now existing, but it may be safely predicted that there will be
practically as many new samples of compensation laws to deal with as there are states to enact them").
256
5ee Wylie, supra note 45, at 70 ("The necessity for a Federal Statute-uniform in its every particular is greater now than ever before, and until such time as this adequate measure is enacted, the present
chaotic conditions will continue"). Congress had recently superseded state statutes giving a lien upon a
vessel for supplies and repairs furnished in a home port with a uniform federal lien act. 36 Stat. 604
(1910). On the connection between the uniformity norm and the enhancement of the lawmaking authority of the federal judiciary, see Purcell, supra note 206, at 172-75.
257
Hamm, supra note 2, at 124. By 1903, the number had contracted to three, id. at 125, while as of
1900 37 states had local option laws. Id. at 133.
2
'Hamm, supra note 2, at 228-35.
"591d. at 238.
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proposed amendment to a Postal Appropriations bill that subjected to federal
penalties any person who sent liquor ads into dry areas with state laws prohibiting liquor advertising "caught the drys by surprise." "[T]he resolutions of
the 1915 convention of the Anti-Saloon League called for barring liquor from
interstate commerce" but, fearful "that such a nationalistic course would
weaken southern states'-rights support for the league program," "the league
had taken no action on this proposal."2" Only after the passage of the Reed
Amendment and the subsequent mobilization for war later in the year did the
movement for national prohibition appear to have sufficient momentum.26 '
State policy on the liquor question had for years been a patchwork ranging
from licensure to local option to regulation to prohibition.262 In January of
1917, twenty-six years after the enactment of the Wilson Act, the prospects
for a uniform national policy on the liquor question still looked doubtfulcertainly much dimmer than prospects for a uniform national compensation
law for maritime workplace injuries must have seemed.263 The diversity of
local schemes of liquor regulation, coupled with the intensity of feeling on
this issue, had long militated against a uniform federal solution. White,
McKenna, and Day may well have been prepared to compromise the uniformity requirement on the Commerce Clause side because, given the constraints
imposed by Leisy, it appeared to be the only politically feasible alternative to
the prospect of a virtually unregulated interstate liquor market.2" By contrast,
2

IId. at 238-39.
26
Id. at 240-55. As Charles Merz put it, "The war did three things for prohibition. It centralized
authority in Washington; it stressed the importance of saving food; and it outlawed all things German."
See T. Pegram, Battling Demon Rum 144-47 (1998).
262
See the remarks of Representative Hill in the Wilson Act debates: "regulation and control of the
liquor traffic ... can not be done by Congress by one uniform and inflexible rule without breaking down
or interfering with the laws of the various States on this important subject. The laws of no two States regulating the liquor traffic are precisely alike. Some, like Iowa and Kansas, have absolute prohibition; all
the others, Illinois included, have the license system in one form or another." 21 Cong. Rec. 7519 (1890);
Snider, supra note 104, at 45 (1917); E. Freund, The Police Power 195-205 (1905).
263
At the beginning of 1917, fewer than half the states were dry. Twenty-three had adopted prohibition by the start of the year; four more would fall in step before the year's end. See E. Cherrington, The
Evolution of Prohibition in the United States 317-64 (1920, reprint 1969); Pegram, supra note 261, at
136-65; J. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement 1900-1920, at 149-84 (1966). Dry victories in the 1916 elections augured well for congressional passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, but by
no means assured ratification by the requisite thirty-six states. Timberlake, supra, at 172.
2
"This had been the approach taken by some reluctant proponents of the Wilson Act. Believing that
Leisy had been incorrectly decided, they saw the Act as the only means by which the rightful police powers of the States could be restored to them, and accordingly swallowed their own conscientious nondelegation and uniformity objections to the bill's constitutionality. See 21 Cong. 5086-88 (remarks of Sen.
Evarts); id. at 4957-58, 5325-30, 5425-26 (remarks of Sen. George). As Thomas Reed Powell put it,
Clark Distilling "permits Congress and the states to cooperate so that a state may be allowed to enforce
its local policy without waiting till that policy receives sufficient sanction to be imposed throughout the
nation. A contrary decision in the principal case would have been most regrettable." Powell, supra note
142, at 139.
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there appeared to be something approaching a policy consensus on the desirability of workmen's compensation for maritime injuries. The unanimous
congressional support for the Johnson Amendment and its 1922 successor
may have served only to reinforce a view that a compromise of the uniformity requirement was here unnecessary. It may be, then, that this constitutional
divergence of Commerce Clause and admiralty jurisprudence occurred not
because liquor was constitutionally "different," but because its political difference had a powerful shaping effect on Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
And it was this shaping effect that provided part of the contrast making admi'
ralty appear constitutionally "special."265
VIII
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests some larger lessons. The first is that,
despite the jurisprudential distinctiveness of maritime law, we cannot develop an adequate understanding of Jensen and its progeny without situating
those landmark admiralty decisions in the broader context of federalism
jurisprudence and law reform from which they emerged. Armed with an
appreciation of the impulses animating the contemporary uniform laws
movement and of the cognate developments in Commerce Clause jurisprudence prompted by other Progressive Era social reforms, we are afforded a
view of the decisions unavailable from within the narrower confines of the
subdiscipline of admiralty law. Second, as the debates over initiatives such as
the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Mann Act illustrate, the flurry of
Progressive Era congressional activity seeking to supply federal solutions to
social problems was prompted in large measure by changes in the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause and Admiralty Clause jurisprudence that placed
novel limitations on the exercise of state police powers. These statutes and the
decisions upholding them were, to be sure, manifestations of a new, nationalist impulse toward regulatory centralization in an increasingly complex and
integrated national economy. But by dissociating these statutes from the dormant Commerce Clause context from which they emerged, we lose sight of
"It is instructive to compare the case of convict-made goods, the other area in which the Court upheld
Wilson and Webb-Kenyon style solutions to the dormant Commerce Clause problem. At the end of 1937,
by which time the Court had upheld both the Hawes-Copper Act and the Ashurst-Sumners Act, there
were still fifteen states that had no law prohibiting or regulating the sale of prison-made goods.
Kallenbach, supra note 104, at 302. Twelve states prohibited the sale of distribution of prison-made goods
altogether; sixteen additional states had enacted general prohibitions with certain exemptions, and eight
states specifically prohibited the sale or distribution of imported prison-made goods. 45 Monthly Lab.
Rev. 1424 (1937), reprinting Prison Industrial Organization Administration, Chart and Comment on
Laws Affecting the Labor of Prisoners and the Sale and Distribution of Prison-Made Products in the
United States, Bulletin No. 1 (1937).

58

Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce

Vol. 32, No. 1

the fact that they, like the Johnson Amendment and the LHWCA, were undeniably direct responses to constitutional disabilities the Court had imposed
upon state regulatory authority. Third, the underlying political realities facing
particular social reform movements informed the type of cooperative solution
that Congress would supply to ameliorate the predicament into which states
and localities had been placed by these turns in the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. Where there was virtual policy consensus among the states, as
there was with respect to lotteries, impure food and drugs, prostitution, and
workmen's compensation, Congress ultimately solved the dormant commerce or Admiralty Clause problem by enacting a uniform rule that applied
throughout the relevant federal jurisdiction. Only where there was substantial
heterogeneity in the state regulatory response, as there was in the cases of
temperance and convict labor, would Congress typically employ the divesting formula of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. Though unenforced by the
Court in the Commerce Clause context, the uniformity and nondelegation
norms continued to enjoy substantial endorsement from the Congress and the
White House. This made uniform national legislation the preferred solution
to the dormant Commerce Clause problem created by Leisy, and the path of
least resistance for reformers in the national legislature. Fourth, as
Knickerbocker Ice and Dawson teach us, those same underlying political
realities would play a role in the Court's decision whether to accept the particular cooperative solution proposed by Congress, or to channel congressional action into an alternative form. Finally and, appropriately, fifth, no historian can hope to come to grips with the constitutional history of the
Progressive Era without eventually turning to liquor.

